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Abstract 
The Indonesian food and beverages industry contributes significantly to the Indonesian GDP 
and is an important provider of employment. However, this industry is characterized by high 
industrial concentration which may affect pricing and performance. The objective of this 
thesis is to examine market structure, price rigidity, and performance as well as their 
relationship in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. To investigate the relationship 
between market structure, price rigidity, and performance, this research uses two main 
frameworks: Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and new empirical industrial 
organization (NEIO). 
This thesis uses firm-level (establishment) data of 59 subsectors of the food and beverages 
industry sourced from the manufacturing survey of the Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS) 
over the period 1995-2006. Econometric methods and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are 
used to address the overall objective.  
Empirical results show that industrial concentration converges to the same value across 
subsectors in the long run. Seven years after the introduction of the competition law in 1999, 
industrial concentration and price-cost margin are still high. Industrial concentration has a 
positive effect on the price-cost margin. Besides stopping the upward trend of the price-cost 
margin, the introduction of the 1999 competition law reduced the effect of industrial 
concentration on the price-cost margin. The results also suggest that there is only a one-way 
relationship between industrial concentration and technical efficiency with industrial 
concentration affecting technical efficiency negatively. Furthermore, this thesis finds 
evidence that high industrial concentration increases price flexibility with the speed of price 
adjustment being higher when costs go up than down in the concentrated subsectors. Finally, 
the results show that there is a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, 
price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. A bi-directional relationship 
between industrial concentration and price-cost margin was found. 
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1.1 Background 
The food and beverages industry in Indonesia is one of the country’s most important 
economic sectors. This industry has a large share in the Indonesian gross domestic product 
(GDP) and total employment. Data from the Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics reveal 
that the output of this sector accounted for about 7% of the GDP and the sector absorbed 
about 23% of total employment in the Indonesian manufacturing industry in 2006. 
Furthermore, more than 50 per cent of the Indonesian household income is spent, on average, 
on food and beverages. Also, the Indonesian government pays much attention to the industry, 
since food and beverages products are among the major drivers of inflation in Indonesia.  
 The Indonesian food and beverages industry is highly concentrated (see Bird, 1999) with 
only a few firms dominating the markets for food and beverage products. This dominance 
creates the conditions for exercising market power and enabling a few firms to affect the 
price to enjoy high price-cost margins. This has the potential of reducing consumer welfare 
by transferring consumer surplus to the firms, but more importantly, it could cause a welfare 
loss (deadweight loss) to the economy as a whole.   
 Furthermore, the high industrial concentration in the food and beverages industry is 
relatively persistent for various subsectors (see Bird, 1999). This persistence suggests that 
market dominance could worsen the welfare loss in the long term. The persistence of high 
industrial concentration may be caused by anti-competitive practices such as collusive 
behaviour and formation of trusts. This is, because prior to the economic reform in 1999, the 
Indonesian economy was characterized by many distortions such as monopolies that were put 
in place by the government. The introduction of the competition law in 1999 may have 
affected industrial concentration because it could break anti-competitive practices in the 
industry. Therefore, it is expected that the trend of industrial concentration in the food and 
beverages sectors could converge across subsectors, with some highly concentrated 
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subsectors shifting to a lower industrial concentration. For policy makers, it is important to 
know whether the industrial policies such as the 1999 competition law have been effective in 
reducing industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the industry. 
 Firms operating in the industry with high concentration may exercise market power to 
increase or maintain their price-cost margin. For example, a few leading firms in a highly 
concentrated industry can maintain their price-cost margin by responding more slowly to cost 
decreases (downward rigidity) rather than cost increases (upward flexibility). Because of such 
rigidity, the equilibrium price tends to be much higher than the cost compared to the case 
where price adjusts symmetrically to increases and reductions in cost. This in turn leads to 
welfare losses. Therefore, it is relevant to investigate the effect of industrial concentration on 
price rigidity in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. 
 Furthermore, high industrial concentration could reduce the efficiency of transformation 
of inputs into outputs (i.e. technical efficiency). Higher technical efficiency can also result in 
a competitive price and product quality which can reduce welfare losses. The first line of 
reasoning states that the few firms in a highly concentrated industry tend to be inefficient 
because there is no incentive and no pressure from other competitors. The second line of 
reasoning says that the few leading firms dominating the market may experience economies 
of scale. Also the dominant firms may invest their abundant resources in a better technology 
that makes them more efficient. Thus, high industrial concentration and the benefits that it 
entails for some firms may have a positive relationship with technical efficiency. This 
suggests that firms may be allowed to grow larger in size, while at the same time, allowing 
industrial concentration to increase. Therefore, an empirical investigation that clarifies which 
argument prevails in the Indonesian food and beverages industry is relevant for policy 
makers. 
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 Last but not least, previous studies pointed out that there is an inter-relationship between 
industrial concentration, price rigidity, price-cost margin, and technical efficiency in one 
system of equations (see Zellner, 1989; Kalirajan, 1993; and Caucutt et al., 1999). Also, there 
may be variables having a two-way causal relationship in the system, because the firms in the 
industry may respond simultaneously to a change in one variable. For example, if a few firms 
dominating the industry find that there is a positive effect of industrial concentration on the 
price-cost margin, then the few firms might use their high price-cost margin (for example, by 
investing more on the technology) to increase their shares, which in turn, increases industrial 
concentration simultaneously. Therefore, investigation of all variables in one system of 
equations is important, since the existence of the inter-relationships among the variables 
would make the policy makers face a more complicated policy design problem. The presence 
of a two-way relationship between the variables requires the policy maker to intervene in the 
market by influencing several factors at the same time. Also the possibility of a bi-directional 
relationship between industrial concentration and technical efficiency has policy implications, 
i.e. it determines whether the policy should limit a few firms to grow in scale or whether 
growth of scale and market share should be discouraged.   
 Besides the policy importance of investigating industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
price-cost margin, and technical efficiency, this research is scientifically important because 
such an analysis has not been done comprehensively in Indonesia. Also the investigation only 
of the food and beverages industry could give more precise policy implications. Previous 
investigations about the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency, and price-cost-margin by Bain (1951, 1956), Zellner (1989), Kalirajan (1993) and 
Caucutt et al. (1999) were done separately in different countries and for different sectors. 
Therefore, examining the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
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technical efficiency, and price-cost-margin for the Indonesian food and beverages industry 
contributes to the literature. 
 
1.2 Study objective and research questions 
The main objective of this research is to examine the market structure, price rigidity, and 
performance as well as their relationships in the specific context of the Indonesian food and 
beverages industry. The objective of the thesis is met by addressing the following research 
questions:   
1. Does industrial concentration converge across subsectors of the food and beverages 
industry and what is the relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin after the introduction of the competition law in 1999? 
2. Does industrial concentration have a causal impact on technical efficiency or is there a 
two-way causal relationship between these variables? 
3. Does high industrial concentration limit price movements, especially when production 
cost decreases? 
4. How are industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost 
margin related when examined in a system? 
 
1.3 Market structure, price rigidity, and performance 
The link between market structure, price rigidity, and performance has long been a topic of 
interest to researchers in industrial organization. Based on the same theme, this research 
focuses on the crucial role of measuring and relating market structure, price rigidity, and 
performance in Indonesia, comprehensively.  
 Market structure is a state of market with respect to competition. There are four main 
types of market structure with respect to the seller competition: perfect market competition, 
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monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly (Nicholson, 2004). This research uses 
the degree of seller concentration as a measure of market structure that can classify the 
industry into one of the aforementioned categories of market structure. Price rigidity is 
observed when the price fails to adjust to external conditions because of factors such as 
market power of firms in a highly concentrated industry. Furthermore, performance is a result 
achieved by a firm as a consequence of its market structure or conduct. This research uses 
price-cost margin and technical efficiency as measures of performance.  
 A number of theoretical frameworks underpin the relationship between industrial 
concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin in this research. The 
first framework is the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework. According to the 
original SCP framework (Bain, 1956), industrial concentration has one single direction of 
causality affecting price rigidity and performance. This single direction has been challenged 
by many theoretical and empirical studies.  For example, Clarke and Davies (1982) suggested 
that price-cost margin could also affect industrial concentration. In reaction to these findings, 
the new SCP framework (see Schmalensee, 1982; Lipszynski and Wilson, 2001) suggests that 
there is also a feedback from performance to conduct to structure, since the firms are actively 
pursuing their strategies in response to changes in the market.  
 Within the SCP framework, there are two hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
industrial concentration and technical efficiency, i.e. the efficient-structure and quiet-life 
hypotheses. The efficient-structure hypothesis provides an explanation for the positive 
relationship between industrial concentration and efficiency (Berger and Hannan, 1997). The 
quiet-life hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between industrial concentration and 
industrial performance (Hicks, 1935). Finally, the absolute convergence model is applied 
within the SCP model to investigate the convergence of industrial concentration in the 
industry. 
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 The second framework used in this thesis is new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) framework to derive an estimable model by combining the Cournot oligopoly and 
partial adjustment models. This model also departs from the SCP framework with regard to 
explaining the relationship between price rigidity and industrial concentration by using the 
derived indicator of price adjustment which could not be provided by the SCP framework.  
 
1.4 Description of data 
This research uses secondary data from the Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS). 
This research uses annual survey data of medium and big manufacturing firms which are 
collected by BPS. BPS defines medium-sized firms as those firms employing more than 20 
workers. Firm-level (establishment) data classified into five-digit Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan 
Usaha Indonesia (KBLI) level of the food and beverages industry over the period from 1995 
to 2006 are used. KBLI is comparable with the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC). 
 Since the data are already tabulated by the BPS, issues such as data representativeness 
and quality may arise. Regarding the data representativeness, the survey covers all medium 
and big manufacturing firms. BPS collects the data from more than 6000 firms in the food 
and beverages industry per year, on average. The data are collected by the Sub-district 
statistical officer and Regency/municipality statistics officer. Therefore, the data used in this 
research represent very well the Indonesian food and beverages industry. The data include 
information on the number of workers, wages and salaries, materials used, production, cost 
structure of input, cost structure of output, and energy consumption.  
 With respect to the data quality, all variables in the data survey are also well-defined and 
measured with a complete lay-out questionnaire. For example, input data are taken from the 
data on input use and are measured in Indonesian Rupiah. Although the data are well-defined, 
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the data set suffers from a number of usual problems in data sets like the presence of outliers 
and the possibility of measurement error. Outlier detection and elimination and econometric 
methods have been used in this thesis to overcome the problems.   
 This research also considers a structural change that might affect the data during the 
period of investigation. The structural change can be caused by a major economic crisis in 
1997 and the introduction of the competition law. Also the economic crisis caused a number 
of firms to disappear from the sample because of bankruptcy. In addition, the introduction of 
the competition law may have affected the market share of dominant firms and may have 
affected significantly variables such as input and output of other firms as well as output 
prices. 
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 investigates the industrial concentration and price-cost margin in the food and 
beverages industry. This chapter answers research question 1 about the industrial 
concentration convergence as well as the relationship between industrial concentration and 
price-cost margin. The effect of the introduction of the competition law in 1999 on industrial 
concentration and price-cost margin is also examined in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 measures technical efficiency and examines its relationship with industrial 
concentration in the food and beverages industry. This chapter calculates technical efficiency 
using DEA and examines its relationship with industrial concentration. Granger-causality as 
well as panel data analysis are used to examine the relationship between technical efficiency 
and industrial concentration. 
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity, 
theoretically and empirically. A model derived from the Cournot oligopoly and partial 
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adjustment models are used to see the effect of industrial concentration on price rigidity. The 
model is estimated using panel data techniques. 
Chapter 5 analyses the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, price-cost 
margin, and technical efficiency using a system of equations. This research investigates 
whether there is a simultaneous relationship among the variables in the system. An 
appropriate panel-system of equations model is used to estimate the relationships. 
In chapter 6, the findings from the four last chapters are synthesized to provide conclusions 
and policy implications. Also recommendations for further research are derived from this 
thesis. 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates trends in industrial concentration and its relationship with the price-
cost margin in 54 subsectors of the Indonesian food and beverages sector in the period 1995-
2006. This study uses firm-level survey data provided by the Indonesian Bureau of Central 
Statistics (BPS), classified at the five-digit International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) Level.  The results show a significant increase in industrial concentration in 1995 to 
1999, which coincided with the period of the economic crisis in Indonesia. After 1999, the 
industrial concentration exhibits a slightly decreasing long-term trend. Furthermore, the 
industrial concentration for all subsectors tends to converge to the same value in the long run. 
Additionally, results show that higher industrial concentration yields a higher price-cost 
margin. Finally, the introduction of the competition law in 1999 has slightly lowered 
industrial concentration and the price-cost margin.  
 
Keywords: industrial concentration, price-cost margin, competition law, food and beverages 
sector 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is well known that the industrial concentration in almost all of the economic sectors of 
Indonesia is relatively high (see Bird, 1999). Some sectors in the industry may have a stable 
and high industrial concentration because of the barriers to entry for new potential firms. The 
barriers may be caused by natural conditions, such as economies of scale moulded by 
incumbents, or formal regulations, such as exclusive monopolies, or business strategy.  
 One of the industry sectors with a high concentration is the food and beverages sector. 
Data presented by Bird (1999) showed that almost all of the subsectors of the food and 
beverages sector are highly concentrated. Furthermore, Bird concluded that for some of them, 
high concentration is particularly persistent.  
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 The food and beverages sector contributes significantly to the Indonesian gross domestic 
product (GDP). Since 2004, the output of this sector accounted for about 7% of the GDP and 
about 23% of the total industrial manufacturing output. This sector plays a vital role in the 
Indonesian economy and is a public concern, especially in fulfilling basic food needs. 
Furthermore, the total Indonesian population of about 206 million in 2000 indicates that this 
industry is an important sector. Additionally, the food and beverages sector absorbed about 
23% of total employment in the Indonesian manufacturing industry in 2006, and employment 
in the industry grew significantly (about 19%) in 2006 compared to 2005. 
 Naturally, policy makers and researchers pay considerable attention to the relationship 
between the degree of competition and the price markup in the food and beverages sector, 
mainly because high industrial concentration in the sector will lead to the extraction of 
consumer surplus by the firms, with consequences for the entire population, but especially for 
lower income households. The higher industrial concentration may induce a few dominant 
firms with market power to behave collusively and to generate excess profits by keeping food 
prices higher than in a more competitive market. 
  In 1999, the Indonesian Competition Law No. 5 1999 was established. This law was 
designed to increase effectiveness and efficiency in economic activities through the creation 
of fair business competition and, subsequently, to improve the people’s welfare. The 
Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU) has been the body 
responsible for enforcing the law in Indonesia. Although the KPPU has limited the anti-
competitive behavior of firms, the high concentration in the food and beverages sector 
continues to exist. Furthermore, a study investigating the competition law in Indonesia that 
was conducted after the competition law had been established (Pangestu et al., 2002) found 
ambiguities that are still subject to interpretation in the competition law. The ambiguities may 
make the investigation and the law enforcement on anti-competitive behavior ineffective. 
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  Some previous studies, such as Hill (1987) and Bird (1999), focused on the industrial 
concentration before the Indonesian Competition Law was implemented. Hill (1987) and Bird 
(1999) observed the industrial manufacturing concentration in Indonesia and found that the 
seller concentration was remarkably high. Similar research about the trend of the industrial 
concentration in another Asian country, Malaysia, was conducted by Bhattacharya (2002). 
However, a thorough study of the trend of industrial concentration in the food and beverages 
sector has never been conducted in Indonesia.  
 As briefly explained in the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, the firms in 
the concentrated industry will have a better industrial performance (usually measured by 
profitability or price-cost margin). Some research related to the relationship between the 
industrial concentration and the price-cost margin has been conducted, but mostly in the U.S. 
and some European countries (Collins and Preston, 1969; Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; Ghosal, 
1989; and Prince and Thurik, 1992; Dickson, 2005). A few studies have focused on the 
relationship between industrial concentration and price markup in Asian countries. Gan 
(1978) and Kalirajan (1993), for example, observed that there was a positive and significant 
influence of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin in Malaysian manufacturing. 
Go et al. (1999) also found a positive relationship between the seller’s concentration and the 
price-cost margin in Filipino manufacturing industries. Most of the research conducted to 
date investigated all subsectors of the manufacturing industry. Additionally, the research 
connecting the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the 
Indonesian food and beverages sector is hardly found in the published literature, nationally or 
internationally. The information about the relationship between the industrial concentration 
and the price-cost margin will provide further insight for the policy makers on whether the 
firms in the industry gain more producer surplus through the lessening of the competition and 
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anti-competitive behavior in the industry. Therefore, the investigation of the effect of 
industrial concentration on industrial performance has a high relevance for policy makers.  
  The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, this paper analyzes the trend of industrial 
concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages sector in the period before and after the 
establishment of Indonesian Competition Law. The analysis of the trend includes a test for 
the convergence of industrial concentration in the long run. Second, this paper analyzes the 
relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the Indonesian 
food and beverages industry. Additionally, the effect of the competition law establishment on 
the price-cost margin is measured. 
   
2.2 Industrial concentration and the price-cost margin 
Industrial concentration is a common measure of market structure1. It reflects both the 
number and size distribution of firms in an industry. The industrial concentration may 
represent the market power and the probability of anti-competitive behavior among firms in 
the market.  
 The most commonly used measures of industrial concentration are the concentration 
ratio for n firms (CRn) and the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), which is based on Pepall 
et al. (2008). Both indicators of industrial concentration are based on the market share of the 
firms and calculated by the following formulas:2 



4
1
4
i
ij MS  CR                                                                                                             (1) 
2
1
)(MS  HHI
n
i
ij 

                                                                                                         (2) 
                                                            
1 We define industrial concentration as in Bain (1951)  
2 Considering stocks, this paper calculates industrial concentration based on sales data because sales seem to 
explain more about the market share than the output. 
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where  j = 1,2,…, m indexes the subsector, i = 1,2,…n indexes firm i in a subsector, and MSi 
is  the market share of firm i in its respective subsector. CR4 considers the collective share of 
the four largest firms in a subsector, while HHIj considers the inequality of distribution of 
market shares among all firms in subsector j. 
 Both the CR4 and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures have a limitation in 
the calculation, but they complement each other.3 Hence, it is necessary to use both 
concentration measures to clearly picture the market structure in the industry.  
 Additionally, there are some shortcomings related to the calculation of the concentration 
ratio (CR4 and HHI). The calculation of the concentration ratio will underestimate or 
overestimate the “true concentration” for a series of reasons (Bird, 1999). First, the survey of 
industrial manufacturing in Indonesia includes only the firms classified into large and 
medium firms.4 This may overestimate the industrial concentration because small firms are 
not reported in the survey. Second, BPS reports firm data based on establishment. The 
industrial concentration may be underestimated because the calculation may include leading 
firms that have more than one establishment. Third, the unavailability of information on 
merger activity in the data, especially about horizontal mergers, is likely to lead to an 
underestimation of the industrial concentration. Fourth, because the industrial concentration 
may be higher in the regional than in the national level, the calculation of industrial 
concentration in the national level will be underestimated. Finally, it is noted that the 
industries examined may not be “markets” (see Kamerschen, 1994 for details). 
                                                            
3 CR4 is commonly used to classify the market into some categories of oligopoly (see Shepherd, 1999), but it 
cannot capture the distribution of the market share for all firms in the market. However, HHI can capture the 
distribution of the a firm’s market share in a market, but it is rather difficult to classify the oligopoly categories 
from the HHI. In spite of this, Besanko et al. (2004) gave a classification of market structure based on HHI. 
Furthermore, Liebenberg and Kamerschen (2008) also discussed the importance of using both HHI and 
concentration ratio. 
4 BPS defines medium-sized firms as those firms employing more than 20 workers. 
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 The degree of the biases induced for the reasons mentioned above may not be 
substantial. Bird (1999) gives some arguments in this regard. First, Hill (1990) argued that, in 
the aggregate, the exclusion of small firms is not a serious problem because small firms 
contribute no more than 15% of the total manufacturing value added in 1985. Second, 
different results may exist in the industrial concentration calculation between the method that 
uses the calculation from BPS establishment data and the one that uses the primary firm data.  
Although there will be differences, the industrial concentration trend may still be captured 
quite accurately. Third, vertical, rather than horizontal mergers, are more frequent in 
Indonesian economy. Therefore, the unavailability of information on merger activity will not 
have a great impact on the industrial concentration calculation. Finally, all factors 
underestimating or overestimating the concentration appear not to undermine the trend of the 
concentration, if their net effects remain constant over time (Bird, 1999). 
 This paper also estimates the effect of industrial concentration on industrial performance 
measured by the price-cost margin. The relationship arises because higher industrial 
concentration may lead to higher industrial performance (Bain, 1951; Gupta, 1983). A 
mathematical derivation of the effect of industrial concentration  on the price-cost margin can 
be found in Saving (1970), Cowling and Waterson (1976), Fischer and Kamerschen (2003a, 
b), and Kamerschen et al. (2005).  
 Industrial performance is measured by price-cost margins (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; 
Domowitz et al., 1986; Prince and Thurik, 1992).  The price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated 
according to the formula proposed by Domowitz et al.5 (1986) and Prince and Thurik (1992). 
This formula allows for changes in inventories (∆Inventories), considering that changes in 
                                                            
5 Their (1988) article which has a connection to this article has been challenged by Kamerschen and Park 
(1993a, b).  In the same year, Domowitz et al. (1993) replied that they did not view  the Comment by 
Kamerschen and Park (1993a, b) as a substantive criticism of their (1988) paper, and the issue remains open. 
Industrial concentration and price-cost margin 	 Chapter  2
 
20 
 
inventories are important with regard to the fluctuation in the business cycle in the Indonesian 
economy from 1995-2006:  
esΔInventoriSales 
es ΔInventorif Labord - Cost oValue Adde
PCM 
                                                       (3) 
Value added is calculated by sales minus intermediate inputs except labor cost. 
 
2.3 Data  
The CR4 and HHI for the food and beverages industry are calculated using firm-level data 
from the Annual Manufacturing Survey provided by the Indonesian Bureau of Central 
Statistics (BPS). The dataset covers the period from 1995 to 2006. This paper uses that period 
because of the tractable and comparable data for all subsectors among the years. Furthermore, 
data beyond 2007 have not yet been published.  
  There are 59 subsectors of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Level6  
in the food and beverages industry, 55 of which are related to food processing, with the 
remaining to the beverages industry. This paper excludes five subsectors from the analysis 
because they contain less than four firms in each period. Therefore, this paper uses only 54 of 
the subsectors in the industry. During the period covered by the data, there were, on average, 
5488 firms in the market. About 7.6 percent of them, on average, were involved in exporting 
activities. In 1995 the food and beverages sector had 5335 firms. This number increased 
significantly to 7897 in 2006. Despite this, the number of firms had decreased significantly 
from 5495 to 4850 (a drop of 12%) in 1998, the year that coincided with a major economic 
crisis in Indonesia.  
 
 
                                                            
6 Actual codes used are not the ISIC codes, but comparable, coming from Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha 
Indonesia (KBLI)  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables from 1995-2006 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Minimum Maximum 
CR4 0.633 0.274 0.433 0.081 1.000
HHI  2266 2143 0.946 51.500 10000
PCM 0.181 0.126 0.696 -0.380 0.708
Size (Log of VA) 13.700 2.227 0.162 5.552 18.498
Growth 0.453 1.319 2.912 -0.942 6.963
COR 0.018 0.161 8.944 5.27·10-6 3.937
N-Subsectors 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the data are relatively heterogeneous, with relatively high standard 
deviations and coefficients of variation for all variables. In the period covered by the data, it 
is observed that the average of CR4 is 0.6328, which characterizes the food and beverages 
sector as a tight oligopoly, according to the criteria of Shepherd (1999). It is also seen that the 
average HHI is 2266, which according to Besanko et al. (2004), this classifies the food and 
beverages sector as an oligopoly. The average PCM of 0.181 also indicates that the firms in 
the sector have a positive price markup. Regarding all variables, the data on demand growth 
(Growth) and capital-output ratio (COR) are very heterogeneous.7 The heterogeneous 
condition of the demand growth and capital-output ratio are related to the economic condition 
and capital-output applied by the firms, respectively.8 
                                                            
7 Although the data on demand growth and capital-output ratio are too heterogeneous, this may not undermine 
the accuracy of the estimation given that these two variables appear only as instruments in the model. 
8 The lowest demand growth is found on subsector 15316 (Nuts), which dropped about -94.21% in 2002 
compared to 2001. According to the data survey, this may be caused by firms exiting the market, as well as the 
decrease in the demand for this product in 2002. The highest demand growth was experienced by subsector 
15134 (Dried Fruit and Vegetables), which increased about 696% in 1998 compared to 1997. The significant 
increase of the demand growth in 1998 is caused by the considerable increase of sales in 1998, after the sales 
drop caused by the crisis, starting in mid-1997. The high variation of the capital-output ratio seems obvious 
because of the different capital used in each subsector. The subsector with the highest capital-output ratio is 
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2.4 Empirical model and estimation  
This paper uses two econometric models to investigate the trend of industrial concentration 
and the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin. The first 
model examines the trend of industrial concentration in the industry. It measures whether 
there is a trend for the industrial concentration to move to a certain value. To confirm the 
movement of the trend of industrial concentration for all subsectors in the food and beverages 
sector, this paper uses the theory of absolute convergence9 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 
Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005). The model can indicate whether 
there is a tendency for the convergence of the industrial concentration in the long run to one 
and the same point for all subsectors. In other words, the model assumes that all subsectors 
have the same steady state in the long run. The assumption is relevant because all subsectors 
face the same business characteristics in the Indonesian economy. The absolute convergence 
model10 is defined as: 
j
t
j
t
j
t  Ln MSββ
T
Ln MSLn MS
n
0
0
10 

                                                                         (4) 
where j = 1,2,…,54 indexes subsector, t0 is the initial year for which data are available (1995), 
and tn is the final year (2006). jtMS  is the market structure in period t and subsector j, 
captured by the CR4 and HHI. The model is estimated using cross section regression. The 
food and beverages sector exhibits convergence in market structure if the estimated 
coefficient of β1 is significantly positive. 
 The second model estimates the effect of industrial concentration on the price-cost 
margin in the industry. Higher industrial concentration, followed by higher market power, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15143 (coconut oil), with a value of 3.937, whereas the subsector with the lowest capital-output ratio is 15510 
(liquors), with capital-output ratio of 5.27·10-6. 
9 This model is different from the model used by Bird (1999), who also investigated the trend of the industrial 
concentration using the models of Khemani (1980) and Brozen (1982). 
10 Derivation of this model can be found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and  Sala-i-Martin (1996). 
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increases the ability of the firms or an industry to influence the market equilibrium price. 
Thus, higher concentration is expected to lead to higher price-cost margins. Moreover, based 
on Konings et al. (2001), McCloughan et al. (2007), and Looi Kee and Hoekman (2003), the 
effect of the competition law on the price-cost margin is also investigated. The competition 
law is represented by the dummy variable of the competition law establishment in Indonesia 
as used by Looi Kee and Hoekman (2003). This paper also interacts the competition law 
dummy variable with the industrial concentration. This interaction variable can capture in the 
way industrial concentration affects the price-cost margin after the competition law 
establishment. The effect of the industrial concentration on the price-cost margin may be 
lower after the establishment of the competition law because the law can break the cartel and 
other anti-competitive behavior. As a result, the competition law is also hypothesized to 
affect the price-cost margin indirectly through its influence on the industrial concentration. In 
addition, this paper also introduces trend variables and their interaction with the competition 
law dummy variable to see the trend of the price-cost margin in the whole period as well as 
the competition law effect on the trend of the price-cost margin. The final model of the 
industrial performance-concentration model11 is: 
PCMjt = γj + θ1MSjt + θ2Lawt + θ3Lawt·MSjt+ θ4Trendt + θ5Trendt·Lawt + vjt                 (5) 
where j and t index subsector and time, respectively. Law is a dummy variable that assumes 
the value 1 for the years after the establishment of the competition law (1999), Trend = 
0,1,2,…,T, v is the error term, and PCM is the price-cost margin. 
 Regarding the relationship between industrial concentration and the price-cost margin, 
there is an endogeneity problem in the variable of industrial concentration (Clarke and Davis, 
1982; Kalirajan, 1993). This endogeneity may arise because of the argument that the 
derivation of the price-cost margin comes from an equilibrium condition for profit 
                                                            
11 The derivation of the relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin can be found in 
Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Clarke and Davis (1982). 
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maximization (Jacquemin et al., 1980; Kalirajan, 1993). Additionally, Clarke and Davies 
(1982) established the endogeneity problem through underlying cost and demand conditions. 
Therefore, this paper uses some instrumental variables for the industrial concentration. The 
instrumental variables chosen are based on the works of Mueller and Hamm (1974), 
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), Gupta (1983), Prince and Thurik (1992), Kalirajan (1993), Go et 
al. (1999), and Delorme et al. (2002). The main instrumental variables estimating the 
industrial concentration are industry size (Size), growth of demand (Growth), and capital- 
output ratio (COR). Besides the three main instrumental variables, this paper also uses a 
competition law dummy variable and trend variables as exogenous in the equation that 
determines PCM.  
  Equation (5) is estimated using unbalanced panel data techniques.12 This method uses 
either a fixed effects or random effects model based on the Hausman (1978) test. The fixed-
effects model is chosen if the Hausman test shows that there is correlation between individual 
effects and other regressors. Otherwise, the random effects model will be used. In addition, 
the fixed-effects model uses dummy variables of the subsectors as the source of the 
heterogeneity, whereas the random effects model uses the intercept deviation of each 
subsector across the intercept for all subsectors. 
 
2.5  Results 
2.5.1 Trends of average industrial concentration 
Table 2.2 describes the industrial characteristics such as concentration for the CR4 (4 firms), 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the distribution of the number of firms, and the 
average price-cost margin. The table shows that the industrial concentration was high from 
1995 to 2006, but there was a slightly declining trend, especially after the year 2000. This 
                                                            
12 Some subsectors, such as 15145 and 15149, are not reported in 2006. 
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finding suggests that industrial concentration increased steadily before the establishment of 
Indonesian Competition Law No. 5 1999. After the establishment of the law, the industrial 
concentration decreased slightly over time. Furthermore, the CR4 and HHI decreased on 
average by 0.7% and 0.8%, respectively, every year from 1995-2006. The average increasing 
number of the firms in the industry every year may also be the reason for which the 
concentration is decreasing.  
 The price-cost margin is always positive and exhibits a significant increase by on 
average 100.47% from 1995-1999, which coincided with hyperinflation in 1997-1998 (firms 
sold the old stock at a new price) and the increase in the industrial concentration. The 
increase in the average industrial concentration from 1995-1999 may also have been caused 
by firms exiting the industry, especially from 1997-1999 because of the economic crisis. 
From 1998-1999 there was a 12% reduction in the number of firms in the industry. The 
reduction in the growth of the price-cost margin occurred simultaneously with the decline of 
the growth of the concentration from 2000-2006. 
Table 2.2 Industrial characteristics 1995-2006  
Year 
 
CR4 
 
HHI 
 
Number of Firms 
 
Average PCM 
 
1995-1997 0.645 2572 5495 0.069
1998-2000 0.713 3142 4850 0.225
2001-2003 0.650 2381 5299 0.197
2004-2006 0.626 2345 6308 0.235
Average % Change 
1995-2006 
-0.693 
 
-0.796 5.133 38.593 
Average % Change 
1995-1999 
3.442 
 
8.019 -5.982 100.470 
Average % Change 
2000-2006 
-3.056 
 
-5.833 11.485 3.234 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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  Based on the estimation of Eq. 4, Table 2.3 shows that the parameter estimate for the 
initial industrial concentration is negative (implying that β1>0), which means that there is 
absolute convergence in the industrial concentration in the long run. Therefore, in the long 
run, industrial concentration tends to converge to one and the same value for all subsectors. It 
can be concluded that the subsectors with a relatively low industrial concentration in 1995 
grew relatively fast after the year 1995. 
Table 2.3 Absolute convergence of industrial concentration 
Independent Variable  
Dependent Variable: 
T
CR4Ln CR4Ln j1995
j
2006   
Dependent Variable:  
T
HHILn HHILn j1995
j
2006   
Coefficients Coefficients 
Intercept -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.270*** 
(0.073) 
LnCR4j,1995 (-β1) -0.029*** 
(0.007) 
 
LnHHIj,1995 (-β1)  -0.039*** 
(0.010) 
R2 0.231 0.222 
F-statistics 15.606*** 14.806*** 
Notes: Values of SE are given within parentheses 
***  denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
  Table 2.4 also supports this finding. It shows that the five most concentrated industries 
(according to CR4) tend to change slowly over times and some of them experienced 
concentration reduction, such as the milk, food and wheat flour subsectors. The five least 
concentrated (CR4) subsectors experienced a significant increase in concentration. For three 
of them, the increase was larger than 15%, on average. 
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Table 2.4 Average % change of industrial concentration (CR4) 
The Five Largest CR4 
 
Average % 
Change 
The Five Lowest CR4 Average % 
Change 
15212 
(Milk Food) 
-1.015 
15492 
(Ice Cubes, other ices) 
6.73 
15530 
(Beer) 
0.055 
15311 
(Rice Milling) 
19.41 
15321 
(Wheat Flour) 
-1.827 
15141 
(Crude Cooking Oil) 
17.64 
15131 
(Canned Fruit, Vegetables) 
1.043 
15496 
(Crackers and Other Chips) 
17.08 
15329 
(Other Starch Nec) 
1.401 
15323 
(Tapioca) 
1.17 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
2.5.2  The effect of industrial concentration on price-cost margin 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the estimation of Equation (5), which is estimated using a 
fixed-effects model with stationary level-form data. The fixed-effects model is used because 
the Hausman (1978) test rejected the random effects specification. Furthermore, based on the 
stationarity test of Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC) test (2002), the null hypothesis of non-stationary 
data of the CR4 and PCM is rejected at the 1% critical level, which indicates that the data at 
the level form are valid for use in the model.  
  The White test for heteroscedasticity (Castilla, 2008) rejects the null hypothesis of the 
absence of heteroscedasticity at the 1% critical level. To address the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, this paper applies the generalized least square (GLS) method to estimate 
the model. 
  The results in Table 2.5 suggest that industrial concentration has a significant effect on 
the price-cost margin, both for the CR4 and HHI measures. As expected, higher industrial 
concentration yields a higher price-cost margin for the firms. The CR4 coefficient of 0.824 
indicates that the price-cost margin will increase by 0.824% following a 1% rise in industrial 
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concentration. Additionally, the HHI coefficient of 0.091 shows that the price-cost margin 
will increase by 0.091 units for every 1-unit (1000) increase in HHI. Therefore, results show 
that firms in the food and beverages sector benefit from the oligopolistic market structure. 
This result is also supported by the data, given that every year, on average, the industry 
experienced about 18.1% of price-cost margin from 1995-2006 (see Table 2.1). The results 
presented here also support the findings of other studies, such as Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), 
Prince and Thurik (1992), Kalirajan (1993), Go et al. (1999), and Delorme et al. (2002), 
which found a positive impact of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin. 
Table 2.5 Regression of industrial concentration and other variables on the price-cost 
margin 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable : AVERAGE PCM 
Coefficients  Coefficients 
Intercept -0.499*** 
(0.110) 
-0.189*** 
(0.043) 
CR4 
 
0.824*** 
(0.196) 
 
HHI  
 
0.091*** 
(0.025) 
Law 0.373*** 
(0.043) 
0.339*** 
(0.033) 
Law*CR4 -0.342*** 
(0.088) 
 
Law*HHI  -0.064 
(0.019) 
Trend 0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
Trend*Law -0.031** 
(0.013) 
-0.049*** 
(0.011) 
R2  0.273 0.338 
F-statistics  9.690*** 10.651*** 
Notes:   **     denotes test statistic significance at the 5% level             Values of SE are given within parentheses 
              ***  denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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  Furthermore, based on the estimated fixed effects of both models with CR4 and HHI, it is 
observed that without any influences of the industrial concentration and other variables in the 
model (ceteris paribus), the subsectors of the food and beverages sector have a heterogeneous 
price-cost margin.13 It is also found that the subsectors that are among the least concentrated 
have a high price-cost margin, indicating that for these subsectors, the degree of 
concentration is not a very good predictor of PCM. Instead, the high price-cost margin is 
captured in the model by the fixed-effects,14 which is not surprising because fixed effects 
parameters take into account some unobserved heterogeneities, such as different 
characteristics of the industry and scale effect.  
  The parameter associated with the trend suggests a positive movement of the price-cost 
margin during the period. The trend variable coefficient shows that the price-cost margin 
increases by 0.036 and 0.049 each year for the CR4 and HHI models, respectively.  
  To examine the effect of the competition law on the price-cost margin, the first order 
derivatives are calculated for the CR4 and HHI models. We obtain:15 
                                                            
13 In the CR4 model, the lowest and the highest fixed effects parameters are -0.248 and 0.333, respectively. 
Almost similar to the CR4 model, in the HHI model, the lowest and the highest fixed effects parameters are            
-0.253 and 0.200, respectively. 
14 Based on the parameters of the fixed effects of the model with CR4, some subsectors, such as 15492 (ice 
cubes and other ice products), 15421 (granulated sugar), 15141 (crude cooking oil), 15540 (soft drinks), and 
15496 (crackers and other chips), have the highest price-cost margin in the period of estimation. However, some 
subsectors, such as 15329 (other starch nec), 15321 (wheat flour), 15530 (beer), 15134 (dried food, vegetables), 
and 15312 (other grain milling), have the lowest price-cost margin in the period of estimation. Also, based on 
the parameters of the fixed effects of the model with HHI, some subsectors, such as 15421 (granulated sugar), 
15510 (liquors), 15540 (soft drinks), 15139 (other fruit and vegetables), and 15141 (crude cooking oil), have the 
highest price-cost margin in the period of estimation. However, some subsectors, such as 15329 (other starch 
nec), 15134 (dried food, vegetables), 15125 (processed fish), 15321 (wheat flour), and 15423 (other sugars), 
have the lowest price-cost margin in the period of estimation.  
15 We slightly abuse notation here. Although we use the partial derivative sign, we evaluate the effect of the 
competition law as the dummy variable changes from zero to one. 
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trendCR
Law
PCM 
 031.04342.0373.0                                                                   (6) 
trendHHI
Law
PCM 
 049.0064.0339.0                                                                  (7) 
The averages for CR4 and HHI are 0.633 and 2266, respectively, and the average trend is 5.5. 
The net effects of the law on PCM are calculated as -0.014 and -0.075 for the CR4 and HHI 
models, respectively. The results regarding the Law variable suggest that the Competition law 
has affected price-cost margin in various ways. First, the parameters associated with the 
interaction term of Law and the concentration ratios (CR4 and HHI) show that the policy has 
had a more negative effect on the price-cost margins of subsectors that were characterized by 
higher concentration ratios, which implies that the policy has been targeted more toward 
sectors with a high price-cost margin. Second, the parameters of the interaction terms of Law 
and Trend (-0.031 and -0.049) (almost) offset the positive single trend term, which suggests 
that the policy was successful in stopping the upward trend in price-cost margins before 
1999.  
  Regarding the results on the relationship between the law establishment and the price-
cost margin, a number of comments are in order. First, the competition policy may not have 
been applied effectively to reduce market power. McCloughan et al. (2007) argues that only 
an effective competition policy would decrease the price-cost margin. Additionally, Pangestu 
et al. (2002) found ambiguities that are still subject to interpretation in the Indonesian 
competition law, which may make the investigation and the law enforcement on anti-
competitive behavior ineffective. Second, the political stability and improved economic 
environment in 2004-2006 may have resulted in higher profits, thereby confounding the 
effects of the competition law. Better stability and economic environment during 2004-2006 
may come as a result of successful parliamentary and presidential elections in 2004. Indeed, 
the data in Table 2.2 show that the price-cost margin increased steadily from 2004 until 2006. 
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Third, the law establishment may induce firms to innovate and produce differentiated 
products that may sustain higher prices (Looi Kee and Hoekman, 2003), which may result in 
higher price-cost margins. Indeed, since 1999, the variety of products has been significantly 
increasing in Indonesia. Fourth, the increase of the industrial concentration for subsectors 
with low industrial concentration in the initial year may cause the increase of the price-cost 
margin, on average (as predicted by the model of absolute convergence in Equation (4)). This 
finding is in line with the finding that the competition law affected the subsectors with high 
industrial concentration ratios more seriously. Finally, although there are some factors that 
may cause the elevation of the price-cost margin, this result may give a further 
recommendation for an improvement in the competition law in the industry.  
 
2.6  Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the trend and convergence of industrial concentration in the 
Indonesian food and beverages sector. Moreover, it has analyzed the relationship between the 
industrial concentration and the price-cost margin. This paper contributes to the literature by 
applying the concept of convergence to the analysis of the trend in industrial concentration. 
Furthermore, this paper contributes an analysis of the relationship between market structure 
and industrial performance in the food and beverages sector in Indonesia. 
  The results show that the industrial concentration of the subsectors in the food and 
beverages sector tend to be slightly lower in the long run, but the subsectors of the industry 
still have a high industrial concentration (tight oligopoly structure) in the period covered by 
the data. In addition, results show that the industrial concentration converges to the same 
value for all subsectors. Finally, as expected, the industrial concentration is found to have a 
positive effect on the price-cost margin.  
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  The competition law has been relatively more successful in reducing the price-cost 
margin in subsectors that are characterized by a relatively high industrial concentration. 
Furthermore, the law has almost stopped the upward trend in price-cost margins that existed 
before the implementation of the law. Nevertheless, the price-cost margin is still higher after 
the competition law establishment than before, which suggests that a further improvement of 
the competition law is warranted.  
  The results of this paper demonstrate that higher concentration in a subsector leads to a 
higher price-cost margin. One way to lower anti-competitive behavior is to eliminate barriers 
to entry, which effectively lowers concentration. However, the results presented here suggest 
that the effect of the competition law on the price-cost margin is through the concentration. 
More precisely, the competition law lowers the effect of concentration on the price-cost 
margin by breaking cartels.   
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between technical efficiency and industrial 
concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages sector. Firm-level data obtained from the 
Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS) are used to estimate technical efficiency scores 
and calculate measures of industrial concentration. The results show that the food and 
beverages industry is characterized by high industrial concentration and firms in the industry 
are inefficient. The Granger-causality test suggests a one-way direction of causality, with 
industrial concentration having a negative impact on technical efficiency, at the sector level. 
This suggests that the quiet-life hypothesis, rather than the efficient-structure hypothesis, 
applies to the Indonesian food and beverages industry. 
 
Keywords:  technical efficiency, industrial concentration, quiet-life hypothesis, efficient-structure 
hypothesis, data envelopment analysis (DEA)  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The food and beverages sector is one of the economic sectors that contributes significantly to 
the Indonesian gross domestic product (GDP) and employment absorption. Since 2004, the 
output of this sector accounted for about 7% of the Indonesian GDP and about 23% of the 
total industrial manufacturing output.  Additionally, the food and beverages sector absorbed 
about 23% of total employment in the Indonesian manufacturing industry in 2006. However, 
as shown by Setiawan et al. (2012), this sector is characterized by a tight oligopoly structure, 
with the concentration ratio for four firms (CR4) being about 66%, and  has experienced high 
price-cost margins in the period 1995-2006. Given the importance of the food and beverages 
industry in the Indonesian economy, efficient transformation of inputs into outputs is 
necessary to ensure a competitive price and product quality for the consumers.   
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 Efficiency losses in the food and beverages industry, either caused by firm-level 
technical or allocative inefficiency or due to oligopolistic power, may have far-reaching 
consequences for the entire Indonesian economy and the well-being of the local population. 
This industry fulfills primarily the needs of the local population with imports accounting for 
about 6% of total consumption in the sector and exports being less than 3% of the value of 
output in the period 2005-2006. Furthermore, Indonesian households spent about 52.19% of 
their income on food and beverages products in the period 2005-2006. Any type of 
inefficiency associated with the sector will be translated to higher consumer prices, which 
will increase the cost of living and may lead to social unrest. Additionally, there may be 
interrelationship between the high industrial concentration in the sector and firm-level 
efficiency. 
 There are two competing theories that explain the relationship between industrial 
concentration and efficiency, i.e. the quiet-life (QL) hypothesis and the efficient-structure 
hypothesis. The quiet-life hypothesis (Hicks, 1935) suggests that high industrial 
concentration lowers competition among firms, which in turn, reduces incentives for the 
firms to maximize their efficiency. Gumbau-Albert and Maudos (2002) found that there is a 
negative relationship between industrial concentration and efficiency, thus supporting the QL 
hypothesis. Their study showed that firms operating in more concentrated markets had the 
lowest technical efficiency scores. Also Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009) observed that 
more market power means less control on the costs, which makes firms less efficient. 
Furthermore, Setiawan et al. (2012) found that anticompetitive practices exist in the food and 
beverages manufacturing sectors that are characterized by high industrial concentration. 
Thus, according to the QL hypothesis, one may deduce that high industrial concentration may 
lead to inefficiency. The quiet-life hypothesis has been challenged on theoretical grounds 
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(Stigler, 1976) for not providing a viable alternative to profit maximization as the objective of 
monopolists and oligopolists. 
 The second theory, the efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis, states that firms with higher 
efficiency produce at lower cost per unit of output, which in turn leads to higher profits and 
larger market share (Demsetz, 1973). This also causes the efficient firms to grow more 
rapidly in size than less efficient firms. Therefore, profitability and market structure can be a 
mirror of an efficiency difference among firms. In other words, this hypothesis says that 
higher industrial concentration may be created by the efficient firms. In line with this 
hypothesis, Allen et al. (2005) found that the efficient-structure hypothesis applied to the 
trucking industry in the United States. 
 It is important to find out which hypothesis is relevant for the Indonesian food and 
beverages sector. Although previous research investigated technical efficiency in this sector, 
the research did not clarify the relationship between technical efficiency and industrial 
concentration. For example, Margono and Sharma (2006) estimated only technical efficiency 
scores in food, textile, chemical, and metal product industries from 1993 to 2000 in 
Indonesia. Also Ikhsan (2007) only examined technical efficiency in Indonesian’s 
manufacturing industries, including the food and beverages sector, over the period 1988-
2000. He found that average technical efficiency for the sector was declining in the period 
from 1988 until 2000.  
 Determining which hypothesis applies to the Indonesian food and beverages industry is 
also important for inferring the correct policy implications in the industry. The two 
competing hypotheses provide different suggestions to policy makers on actions to take for 
increasing overall economic efficiency. For example, if the QL hypothesis applies to the 
industry, resources are wasted by maintaining an oligopoly structure. On the other hand, if 
the ES hypothesis applies to the industry, physical resources may be economized by having 
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the most efficient firms producing most of the sector’s output, but at the same time, allowing 
for the industrial concentration to increase. Furthermore, evaluating which hypothesis applies 
to the industry will also have implications with respect to the Indonesian competition law. 
The Indonesian competition currently places more weight on the QL hypothesis as it fosters 
competition, as well as, provides law enforcement to break cartels or other anticompetitive 
practices in the Indonesian economy1. Therefore, the study of the relationship between 
technical efficiency and industrial concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages sector 
is relevant for designing economic policy measures in Indonesia. 
 This research focuses on the Indonesian food and beverages industry given its 
importance for the Indonesian economy. Since industrial concentration in the Indonesian food 
and beverages industry is known to be relatively high, evidence on whether the quiet-life  or 
efficient-structure hypothesis applies to the industry again would give an indication on 
whether firms in the industry gain high price-cost margins through formation of cartels or 
other anticompetitive practices, rather than from efficiency gains. This paper has two aims: 
first, this paper estimates firm-level technical efficiency and industrial concentration for the 
Indonesian food and beverages industry2. Second, the investigation on the relationship 
between technical efficiency and industrial concentration is conducted to clarify whether the 
quiet-life or the efficient-structure hypothesis applies to this industry. Therefore, the final 
results of this research are relevant from a policy perspective. Furthermore, this research also 
                                                            
1 Setiawan et al. (2012) found that the introduction of the competition law in 1999 had slightly lowered 
industrial concentration and the price-cost margin in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. 
2 We estimate technical efficiency for each subsector using the firm-level data by averaging the score of 
efficiency of all firms in the subsector. We calculate average technical efficiency for each subsector because we 
cannot relate technical efficiency and industrial concentration in the firm-level data. Moreover, it is not possible 
to use a cost efficiency measure due to unavailability of input price data. 
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fills in the gap of the literature investigating both hypotheses in the Indonesian food and 
beverages sector. 
 Although this research only examines the food and beverages industry, the methods 
presented here can be equally well applied to other sectors of the economy3. Furthermore, 
given the specific characteristics of each sector, different suggestions and policy implications 
could be obtained from the application of the techniques to different sectors. Therefore, the 
test on the applicability of the QL or ES hypothesis in a sector-by-sector basis is more 
appropriate when detailed results are required for designing economic policies. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the modeling approach which is 
broken in two steps. In the first step, technical efficiency scores are estimated using data 
envelopment analysis and industrial concentration is calculated using the four firm 
concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Next, the causality in the 
relationship between technical efficiency and industrial concentration is tested using the 
Granger-causality test. This is followed by the description of data in section III and the 
presentation of the empirical model and results in Section IV. The last section summarizes 
the results and draws conclusions. 
3.2  Modelling approach  
3.2.1 Technical efficiency estimation 
Technical efficiency refers to the ability of a decision-making unit (usually a firm) to 
minimize input used in the production of a given output vector, or the ability to obtain 
maximum output from a given input vector (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). Consequently, a 
firm is fully technically efficient if it produces the maximum possible output from a fixed 
level of inputs (output orientation), or if it uses the minimum possible input to produce a 
                                                            
3 Bird (1999) also found that most of the manufacturing sectors in Indonesia are characterized by a high degree 
of industrial concentration. 
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given level of output (input orientation).  There are two well-known methods for estimating 
the technical efficiency: stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). 
 SFA is a parametric method for estimating firm-or sector-level technical efficiency 
scores by exploiting the skewness of the error in the specification of a production function 
(see Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broek, 1977 for details). The approach 
requires the specification of a functional form and assumptions about the distribution of the 
efficiency term.  DEA (Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984) is a non parametric 
approach to efficiency measurement and requires very few assumptions about the properties 
of the production possibilities set. DEA uses the frontier concept directly (by projecting the 
inefficient firm to this frontier) to calculate the technical efficiency score, without assuming a 
specific functional form for the relationship  between inputs and outputs.  In addition, DEA 
takes the most efficient decision-making units (to be 100% efficient) as the basis for 
calculating technical efficiency for other decision-making units.  
 Technical efficiency scores are estimated in this paper using DEA for two reasons. First, 
given that one of the objectives is to infer the direction of causality between efficiency and 
industrial concentration, time-varying estimates of technical are required. DEA can be 
applied separately in every subsector of the food and beverages industry and for every year of 
observed data to provide these estimates4. Second, DEA avoids imposing a common structure 
on the technology of transforming inputs into outputs across subsectors by assuming a 
common functional form for the production frontier.  
                                                            
4 Although estimation of efficiency scores with SFA for every year and subsector separately is possible, such an 
approach would reduce the amount of information required for estimating the parameters of the production 
function in the dataset. On the other hand, imposing a single production function over the years would lead to 
autocorrelation of the efficiency score estimates. This autocorrelation could then affect the Granger-causality 
test that follows. 
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 In general terms, DEA assumes that there are data on N inputs and M outputs for each of 
I firms. For the i-th firm these are represented by the column vectors xi and qi, respectively. 
The NxI input matrix, X, and the MxI output matrix, Q represent the data for all I firms. This 
research uses the output-oriented DEA model5 by solving the mathematical programming 
problem as in Coelli et al. (2005): 
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where   represents a Farrel measure of technical efficiency (Farrel, 1957) with  1 ∞, and 
1  is the proportional increase in outputs that could be achieved by the  i-th firm, with 
input quantities held constant. λ is an Ix1 vector of constants and I1’λ=1 is a convexity 
constraint, with I1 being an Ix1 vector of ones. The convexity constraint is used to impose 
variable returns to scale (VRS), which ensures that an inefficient firm will only be compared 
to firms with a similar scale. The assumption of VRS technologies is also relevant because 
constant return to scale seems a too strong assumption for the Indonesian food and beverages 
sector, as this sector is characterized by many distortions. Regarding the calculation, if there 
are 100 firms in a subsector, the DEA frontier will be calculated by solving 100 linear 
programming problems of the form presented in (1), one for each of the 100 firms in the 
subsectors. We define  ˆ/1),(ˆ yx  as a measure of technical efficiency that assumes values 
in the unit interval so that the bootstrap method that follows is well defined. 
                                                            
5 We use output-oriented DEA to identify technical inefficiency as a proportional increase in output production, 
with input levels held fixed. This assumption might be relevant in the industry because small and medium firms 
find some difficulties to access  the financial institution in order to expand their business in most of the periods. 
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 To get robust estimates of the efficiency scores, this research uses the bootstrap 
technique of Simar and Wilson (Simar and Wilson, 1998). This technique is also expected to 
reduce the serial correlation problem in the efficiency scores among firms. The bootstraping 
method is repeated simulation of the data generating process, using a resampling method and 
applying it to the original estimator to the simulated sample so that the simulated estimates 
mimic the sampling distribution of the original estimator (Simar and Wilson, 1998). As the 
final result, we provide only the biased-corrected efficiency scores as accurate measure of 
efficiency, obtained using the formula: 
 ),(ˆbias),(ˆ),(ˆˆ yxyxyx B    
            = 
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B
b
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with the condition of sample variance ),(ˆ* yxb <   2),(ˆˆ31 yxiasb B                                  (3)                           
In the last two relations ),(ˆ yx  and ),(ˆˆ yx are the consecutive original and biased-corrected 
efficiency scores, and ),(ˆ* yxb is the bootstrap estimate of the efficiency score in the bth out 
of B  bootstrap repetitions. 
 
3.2.2  Industrial concentration calculation 
Industrial concentration is measured using both the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) and 
the concentration ratio for n firms (CRn), which is based on Pepall et al. (2008). Both 
indicators of industrial concentration are based on the market share of the firms and 
calculated by the following formulas:6 
                                                            
6 Considering stocks, this paper calculates industrial concentration based on sales data because sales seem to 
explain more about the market share than output. 
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where  j = 1,2,…, m indexes the subsector, i = 1,2,…n indexes firms within a subsector, and 
MSi is  the market share of firm i in its respective subsector. CR4j considers the collective 
share of the four largest firms in subsector j, while HHIj considers the inequality of 
distribution of market shares among all firms in subsector j. Both the CR4 and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measures have limitations in their calculation, but they 
complement each other.7 Hence, it is necessary to use both concentration measures to clearly 
depict market structure in the industry. 
 
3.3 Technical efficiency-industrial concentration model  
To confirm whether there is a relationship between industrial concentration (MS) and 
technical efficiency (TE), we use a panel Granger-causality test. Since both TE and MS, as 
expressed by CR4, are restricted in the unit interval, we take the logistic transformation of the 
estimated measures of TE and CR48. The logistic transformation is needed to ensure that the 
estimates of TE will be maintained between 0 and 1 as MS increases.  
                                                            
7 CR4 is commonly used to classify the market into some categories of oligopoly (Shepherd, 1999), but it cannot 
capture the distribution of the market share for all firms in the market. On the other hand, HHI can capture the 
distribution of a firm’s market share in a market, but it is rather difficult to classify the oligopoly categories 
from the HHI. In spite of this, Besanko et al. (2004) gave a classification of market structure based on HHI. 
Furthermore, Liebenberg and Kamerschen (2008) also discussed the importance of using both HHI and 
concentration ratio. 
8 The logistic transformation maps CR4 or TE from the unit interval to the real line by using the invers of the 
logistic function, xe1
1
. Since HHI can assume any positive value and typically is centered away from zero, 
this variable is not transformed prior to estimation.  
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  A Granger-causality test gives an indication of the direction of the relationship between 
industrial concentration and technical efficiency. The Granger-causality test is based on the 
following vector autoregression model (VAR): 
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Since we use panel data, we use the Arrellano-Bond (1991) estimator for equations (6) and 
(7) to control for unobserved heterogeneity using the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) (Verbeek, 2008). We consider the error term in these two equations as innovations, 
uncorrelated with past values of the regressors. In this setting the Arrelano-Bond estimator 
exploits additional moment conditions by using a list of instruments that vary with t. The list 
of instrumental variables consists of the lags of the variables instrumented. These lags are 
correlated with the endogenous variables, but, under the view of the error terms as 
innovations,  they do not correlate with the error terms. The Granger-causality test uses a 
Wald test (coefficient-restriction test) on the variables observed. The test gives an indication 
of whether QL or ES hypothesis applies in the food and beverages industry.  
 To examine the relationship between the industrial concentration and technical 
efficiency, a panel-data model is built based on the results of the Granger-causality test, as 
follows: 
jtjtjjt uxy                                                                                                        (8) 
where j and t index subsector and time, respectively. Variables y and x are industrial 
concentration (MS) and technical efficiency (TE). Based on the Granger-causality test, eq. (8) 
can only be a single model confirming true direction of causality as stated in QL or ES 
hypothesis. For example, if the Granger-causality test supports the QL hypothesis, then eq. 
(8) is used to determine the concurrent effect of industrial concentration on technical 
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efficiency. Otherwise, eq. (8) is specified such that the effect of technical efficiency on 
industrial concentration is determined.  From eq. (8), we hypothesize that if the QL 
hypothesis applies to the industry, then MS has a negative effect on TE, whereas if the ES 
hypothesis applies to the industry, then TE has positive effect on MS. We account for 
endogeneity in eq. (8) using the method described in Clarke and Davies (1982) and Gumbau-
Albert and Maudos (2002), i.e. we use instrumental variables for eq. (8) to deal with the 
endogeneity problem.  
 
3.4  Data and variables measures 
This research uses firm-level data to estimate efficiency scores and generate industrial 
concentration measures in each subsector of the food and beverages industry. The data are 
obtained from the Annual Manufacturing Survey provided by the Indonesian Bureau of 
Central Statistics (BPS). The dataset covers the period from 1995 to 2006 for which the data 
are tractable and comparable for all subsectors among the years. Furthermore, data beyond 
2007 have not yet been published. 
 Regarding the technical efficiency estimation, we use 33 subsectors at the 5-digit level of 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system9. The 33 subsectors contain 
more than 30 firms, on average, in the period from 1995 until 2006. Considering the small 
samples, we use only the subsectors with sufficient observations. For the remaining 
subsectors, those that have less than 30 observations, are combined at the 4-digit ISIC level. 
                                                            
9 Actual codes used are not the ISIC codes, but comparable, coming from Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha 
Indonesia (KBLI). There are 59 subsectors in the food and beverages industry classified into the 5-digit ISIC 
level, 55 of which are related to the food processing, with the remaining to the beverages industry. We use only 
33 out of 59 subsectors because the remaining subsectors have less than 30 observations on average during the 
period 1996-2006. In our case, we find that DEA does not estimate valid technical efficiency scores for the 
subsectors which have less than 30 observations, on average. 
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Therefore, there are 6 (six) new subsector names of the 33 subsectors, which are the 
combination of some subsectors.10 
  The food and beverages industry uses raw material, labor, and fixed capital such as 
machinery, equipment, etc. to produce the finished good. Output is defined as value of gross 
output produced by establishment every year and deflated by the wholesale price index of 
food and beverages (WPI). Labor efficiency units are used as a proxy for labor11. Raw 
material is the total costs of domestic12 and imported raw materials and is deflated by the 
wholesale-price index  (WPI) of raw materials for food and the official WPI for imported raw 
food published by the BPS. We define fixed capital as fixed assets, deflated by the WPI of 
machinery (excluding electrical products), transport equipment, residential, and non 
residential buildings. 
  Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the research. It is 
observed that the average of CR4 is 0.482, which characterizes the food and beverages sector 
as an oligopoly, according to the criteria of Shepherd (1999) and Besanko et al. (2004). The 
coefficients of variation of the input (material, labor, and capital) and output variables among 
the subsectors of the food and beverages industry are quite high.  This suggests big 
differences in the size of the firms and the technologies used between subsectors.  
 
 
                                                            
10 The 6 (six) new subsectors are derived by combining subsectors with insufficient observations in the 
following way: 15113 = 15111+15112 ; 15130 = 15131+…+15134+15139 ; 15210=15211+…+15213 ; 15319 = 
15312 + 15314+…+15318 ;  15320 = 15321 + 15324+ 15329 ; 15420 = 15422+15423+15424+15429 
11 We modify  the formula for labor efficiency units used by Tybout and Westbrook (1995) as: 
)
 workerproduction ofsalary 
erother work ofsalary  
(*ersother work ofnumber    workersproduction ofnumber   L   
12 Domestic raw materials also include other costs related to the production such as electricity and fuel cost. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables from 1995-2006 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Maximum Minimum 
CR4 0.482 0.220 0.457 0.967 0.081 
HHI 1217.736 1219.341 1.001 7441.578 51.465 
Material (in Millions Rupiah) 185.259 1254.719 6.773 127257.103 0.102 
Labor (Person Index) 171.845 1281.995 7.460 167086.381 4.000 
Capital (in Millions Rupiah) 1901.208 65435.776 34.418 7321000 0.099 
Output (in Millions Rupiah) 225.270 1372.521 6.093 74304.753 2.113 
Size (Log of Value Added)) 14.733 1.620 0.109 18.498 10.224 
Growth of Value Added 0.352 0.943 2.679 6.466 -0.863 
Capital-output ratio (COR) 0.023 0.210 9.130 3.69·10-4 3.937 
N-Subsectors 33 33 33 33 33 
Notes: CR4 = Concentration ratio for four firms  
            HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
            COR = Capital-output ratio 
Source: Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics and Author’s calculation  
 
3.5  Empirical model and results 
3.5.1 Technical efficiency and industrial concentration 
Table 3.2 shows both the average biased-corrected technical efficiency scores and industrial 
concentration measures for subintervals of the period covered by the data. The results show 
that, along the period, there is no clear path of the relationship between industrial 
concentration and efficiency. The efficiency score as well as the industrial concentration are 
relatively stable, except for the period from 1998-2000. During the period of economic crisis 
(1997-1998), there are many firms exiting the industry, which may explain the increase in 
industrial concentration and technical efficiency. 
  Furthermore, Table 3.2 shows that the sectors in the food and beverages industry are 
relatively inefficient in the period of estimation. During the period 1995 to 2006, the average 
technical efficiency score is 0.550, which means that the firms in subsectors of the food and 
beverages industry, on average, exploit 55% of their production potential. Based on the data, 
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the subsector “other foods from soybean and nuts” (15495) has the highest technical 
efficiency, whereas the subsector “processed tea and coffee” (15491) has the lowest technical 
efficiency13. The average technical efficiency of the Indonesian food and beverages sector is 
close to the technical efficiency score of 0.413 found by Ikhsan (2007) over the period from 
1988 to 2000. Furthermore, similarly low technical efficiency scores were found in other 
Asian countries. Ismail (2009), for example, reported that the technical efficiency score in the 
Malaysian food and beverages industry is between 0.349 and 0.617 in the period 1985-2003. 
Table 3.2 Technical efficiency score and industrial concentration 
Period 
Average Biased-Corrected 
Technical Efficiency Score 
CR4 HHI 
1995-1997 0.552 0.445 1027.500 
1998-2000 0.567 0.534 1414.497 
2001-2003 0.539 0.475 1139.045 
2004-2006 0.543 0.475 1289.903 
1995-2006 0.550 0.482 1217.736 
Notes: CR4 = Concentration ratio for four firms  
            HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
  The distribution of market shares, as captured by the HHI, changes overtime during the 
period from 1995 to 2006. The average is 1217.736, and its volatility reflects the dynamics of 
competition among firms in the subsectors of the food and beverages industry. Although 
there might be a dynamic competition, the concentration ratio of four firms (CR4) is still high 
in the subsectors, with an average of 0.482 in the period from 1995 to 2006. This value of 
industrial concentration classifies the food and beverages industry into an oligopoly. 
 
                                                            
13 The technical efficiency score for each sector, as well as, the confidence intervals of the biased-corrected 
technical efficiency score are presented in the appendix Table A.1. 
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3.5.2 Model estimation 
Granger-causality test  
To investigate whether the QL or ES hypothesis applies to the Indonesian food and beverages 
industry, we employ the Granger-causality test within a vector autoregression model with 
Arrelano-Bond estimation approach. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggests that 
two lags are appropriate. Using the stationarity test of Levin, Lin, Chu (LLC) (2002), we find 
that both industrial concentration and technical efficiency are stationary at the 5% critical 
level, so the Granger-causality test is based on the level form of the variables. Table 3.3 
shows the results of the Granger-causality test. 
Table 3.3 VAR Granger-causality/block exogeneity Wald tests  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Average Biased-Corrected 
Technical Efficiency Score
CR4 HHI 
Excluded Chi-sq Chi-sq. Chi-sq. 
CR4 88.591***   
HHI 8.622**   
Average Biased-
Corrected Technical 
Efficiency Score 
 0.577 1.995 
Notes:  **    denotes test statistic significance at the 5% level 
            ***  denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level 
           CR4 = Concentration Ratio for Four Firms  
           HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
  The Granger-causality test also suggests that the efficient-structure hypothesis does not 
apply to the food and beverages industry. As shown by Setiawan et al. (2012), the industrial 
concentration of all subsectors in the food and beverages industry converge to the same value 
in the long run, where the subsectors with high industrial concentration (they might becoming 
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inefficient or no room for improvement) will have lower industrial concentration and the 
subsectors with low industrial concentration (they might becoming efficient) will have higher 
industrial concentration in the long run. Also, Alam and Morrison (2000) argued that firms 
with a relatively low efficiency have greater scope for improvement. This implies that the 
increase in technical efficiency in the subsectors with low concentration does not contribute 
much to the increase of industrial concentration. 
 
Panel data estimation 
The panel data model is employed to provide an additional test on the applicability of the QL 
hypothesis to the Indonesian food and beverages, i.e. to test whether industrial concentration 
has a negative impact on technical efficiency. We use a fixed-effects model in the panel data 
regression since the random-effects model was rejected by the Hausman (1978) test. The 
White test for heteroscedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of absence of heteroscedasticity at 
the 5% critical level. To address the problem of heteroscedasticity, this paper applies the 
generalized least squares (GLS) method. The instrumental variables for industrial 
concentration are chosen based on Mueller and Hamm (1974), Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974), 
Gupta (1983), Prince and Thurik (1992), Kalirajan (1993), Go et al. (1999), Delorme et al. 
(2002), and Setiawan et al. (2012). The main instrumental variables estimating the industrial 
concentration are industry size (size of value added), growth of demand (growth of value 
added), and capital-output ratio (COR). The results of the panel data model estimation are 
presented in Table 3.4. 
   From the results of Table 3.4 we can observe that the QL hypothesis applies to the food 
and beverages industry. The higher industrial concentration lowers technical efficiency in the 
subsectors of the industry. This relationship is shown by the negative coefficients of -1.139 
and -0.048 for CR4 and HHI, respectively. Since the variables used in the model are obtained 
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through the logistic transformation of the technical efficiency and CR4 variables, there is not 
direct interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficient estimates14. The R2 for both models 
are relatively low because they resulted from a two-stage least squares regression. 
 
Table 3.4 Regression of industrial concentration on technical efficiency  
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable : Average Biased-Corrected Technical Efficiency Score 
Coefficients  Coefficients 
Intercept 1.336*** 
(0.255) 
0.692*** 
(0.026) 
CR4 
 
-1.139*** 
(0.413) 
 
HHI  
 
-0.048** 
(0.021) 
R2  0.124 0.111 
F-statistics  10.918*** 12.383*** 
 Notes: **    denotes test statistic significance at the 5% level                 Standard error in the parentheses 
             ***  denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level 
             CR4 = Concentration ratio for four firms  
             HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
  Based on the fixed-effect coefficients (i.e. the subsector-specific intercepts) of TE model 
with the CR4 and HHI measures (see appendix Table A.2), some subsectors are, ceteris 
paribus, indicated as more efficient than others. For example, subsector “wheat flour, sago, 
and other starch nec.” (15320); subsector “other foods from soybean and nuts” (15495); and 
“soya sauce” (15493) are more efficient than the rest of the subsectors. Looking at the 
subsector characteristics, the difference in the efficiency between subsectors may be caused 
by some unique factors of the subsectors such as the level of technology, basic processing vs. 
                                                            
14 Nevertheless, since the logistic transformation is one-to-one, the negative relationship between industrial 
concentration and technical efficiency can be interpreted directly. Furthermore, HHI in the model is defined as 
HHI/1000 to minimize the reported decimal points in the HHI coefficients. 
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high level processing, managerial ability, economies of scale, and advertising expenses15.  In 
addition, it is also found that the subsectors that are among the higher concentrated have a 
higher technical efficiency16, indicating that for these subsectors, the degree of concentration 
is not a very good predictor of technical efficiency. Instead, the difference in technical 
efficiency is captured in the model by the fixed-effect coefficients, which again is not 
surprising because the fixed-effect parameters account for unobserved heterogeneity, such as 
different characteristics of the subsectors and scale effects, as discussed previously.  
  A negative effect of industrial concentration on technical efficiency is also found in 
Gumbau-Albert and Maudos (2002) and Al-Muharrami and Matthews (2009). Moreover, 
Setiawan et al. (2012) found that industrial concentration affects the price-cost margin in the 
Indonesian food and beverages industry positively. Although the latter may suggest there is a 
high degree of allocative inefficiency, another study by Kalirajan and Shand (1992) found 
that allocative efficiency is affected by technical efficiency. Therefore, since higher industrial 
concentration causes inefficiency in the food and beverages industry, we come to the 
conclusion that cartels and collusion lead to higher industrial concentration and technical 
inefficiency.  
 
3.6  Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper estimates technical efficiency and industrial concentration in the Indonesian food 
and beverages sector. Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature by applying the 
concept of Granger-causality to find whether the quiet-life or the efficient-structure 
                                                            
15 See Gujarati  (2003) who discussed the possible unique factors causing the difference in the fixed effect 
coefficients between firms. 
16 For example, sub sector wheat flour, sago, and other starch nec. (15320) has higher industrial concentration 
than other subsectors, but it also has higher technical efficiency.  
Technical efficiency and industrial concentration Chapter 3 
 
56 
 
hypothesis applies to the Indonesian food and beverages industry. Furthermore, this paper 
analyzes the relationship between technical efficiency and industrial concentration in the food 
and beverages sector in Indonesia. 
  We observe that industrial concentration in the Indonesian food and beverages industry is 
relatively high. The industry is also found to be inefficient over the period under 
consideration.  Furthermore, we found evidence in support of the quiet-life hypothesis (QL 
hypothesis) in the industry, suggesting that a higher industrial concentration decreases 
technical efficiency. This finding implies that firms in highly concentrated industries gain 
more price-cost margin through cartel or anticompetitive practices rather than from efficiency 
gains. Therefore, maintaining such an oligopolistic structure in the industry creates a 
distortion, which implies a waste of resources in the Indonesian economy. 
   Regarding the research findings, the industrial policies should aim at increasing 
competition and promoting free entry in the industry to lower the high industrial 
concentration. Lowering the high industrial concentration would lead to an increase in the 
efficiency of the industry, which may affect the product quality and price to the consumer. 
Furthermore, reviewing the competition law as well as increasing the law enforcement should 
be considered to break more cartels or other anticompetitive practices. The result of the 
Granger-causality test, which rejects the efficient structure hypothesis for the industry under 
consideration, casts doubts on arguments in favor of allowing firms to grow in size in order to 
exploit economies of scale.  
  Finally, since previous research found that other manufacturing sectors in the Indonesian 
economy are characterized by high industrial concentration, future research using the robust 
methods proposed in this paper may be relevant to provide information on whether the QL or 
ES-hypothesis applies to these sectors. Results obtained through this research could provide 
appropriate policy recommendations on a sector-by sector basis.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1  
Biased-Corrected Technical Efficiency Scores and Confidence Intervals 
Period 1995-2006 
 
Subsector Biased-Corrected Technical Efficiency 
95%-Lower 
Confidence Interval 
95%-Upper 
Confidence Interval 
15113 0.685 0.463 0.906 
15121 0.624 0.363 0.884 
15122 0.479 0.204 0.755 
15124 0.514 0.305 0.723 
15125 0.733 0.493 0.973 
15129 0.727 0.428 1.000 
15130 0.554 0.393 0.715 
15141 0.486 0.190 0.781 
15143 0.670 0.400 0.941 
15144 0.675 0.417 0.932 
15210 0.600 0.285 0.915 
15311 0.594 0.258 0.930 
15313 0.461 0.021 0.901 
15319 0.482 0.200 0.764 
15320 0.707 0.472 0.942 
15322 0.606 0.165 1.000 
15323 0.544 0.285 0.804 
15331 0.534 0.333 0.736 
15410 0.347 0.184 0.510 
15420 0.575 0.307 0.843 
15421 0.516 0.298 0.734 
15432 0.528 0.294 0.761 
15440 0.376 0.073 0.679 
15491 0.258 0.040 0.477 
15492 0.505 0.337 0.673 
15493 0.539 0.183 0.896 
15494 0.619 0.434 0.803 
15495 0.767 0.575 0.960 
15496 0.411 0.198 0.623 
15497 0.640 0.292 0.989 
15498 0.607 0.308 0.906 
15499 0.401 0.130 0.673 
15540 0.391 0.132 0.650 
     Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Tabel A.2  
Ordered Fixed Effect Coefficients of Technical Efficiency (TE) Model  
TE model With CR4 Measure TE Model with HHI Measure 
Variable Coefficients Variable Coefficients 
Constant 1.336 Constant 0.692 
Subsector Code Fixed Effect Subsector Code Fixed Effect 
15320 0.134 15320 0.151 
15495 0.099 15493 0.114 
15493 0.090 15130 0.107 
15130 0.081 15495 0.076 
15143 0.078 15125 0.068 
15129 0.076 15143 0.061 
15420 0.071 15420 0.056 
15497 0.066 15129 0.055 
15210 0.058 15113 0.040 
15113 0.057 15497 0.025 
15144 0.043 15498 0.023 
15322 0.040 15210 0.021 
15498 0.028 15322 0.019 
15121 0.027 15144 0.017 
15319 0.016 15121 0.013 
15499 0.001 15319 0.003 
15313 0.001 15499 -0.004 
15125 -0.005 15494 -0.015 
15432 -0.019 15313 -0.026 
15331 -0.022 15331 -0.030 
15124 -0.037 15432 -0.031 
15494 -0.037 15124 -0.034 
15122 -0.046 15323 -0.042 
15421 -0.049 15122 -0.046 
15440 -0.049 15311 -0.046 
15323 -0.055 15421 -0.046 
15540 -0.069 15141 -0.055 
15141 -0.076 15440 -0.057 
15311 -0.079 15492 -0.065 
15410 -0.083 15540 -0.071 
15491 -0.093 15410 -0.082 
15496 -0.109 15496 -0.084 
15492 -0.111 15491 -0.094 
          Notes:  CR4 = Concentration Ratio for Four Firms  
                      HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
         Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Chapter 4 
 
Price Rigidity and Industrial Concentration: Evidence from the Indonesian Food 
and Beverages Industry 
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Abstract   
This paper investigates the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity in 
the Indonesian food and beverages industry. A Cournot model of firm behavior is used in 
which prices adjust according to a partial adjustment mechanism. The model is applied to 
panel data of the Indonesian food and beverages industry over the period 1995-2006. The 
results suggest that industrial concentration has a positive effect on percentage price changes. 
Furthermore, the speed of price adjustment is positively related to industrial concentration 
when the per unit cost of production goes up, especially in concentrated subsectors. 
 
Keywords: price rigidity, industrial concentration, speed of price adjustment, oligopoly 
structure, food and beverages industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Price rigidity is defined as the condition where some prices adjust slowly in response to 
changes in per unit cost of production or changes in supply or demand1. It is one of the most 
important economic issues as rigidity of prices can cause inefficiency in the allocation of 
resources (Carlton, 1986). An important factor influencing price rigidity is the degree of 
industrial concentration (see Stigler, 1947; Carlton, 1986; Bedrossian and Moschos, 1988; 
Caucutt et al., 1999). A few large firms operating in an industry characterized by high 
industrial concentration may use market power to control the price level, as well as, 
variations in the price level.   
   Several studies have examined the relationship between price rigidity and industrial 
concentration, but the results are inconclusive. Means (1935) hypothesized that market 
                                                            
1The concept of the kinked demand curve was introduced by Sweezy (1939) who defined price rigidity as slow 
price adjustment with respect to the other competitors’ strategy. 
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structure can affect pricing behaviour2, but this hypothesis was rejected by Neal (1942) and 
Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1981), suggesting that industrial concentration has no effect on 
price rigidity. Although some researchers rejected Means’ hypothesis, research conducted by 
Weiss (1995), Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), and Caucutt et al. (1999) showed that 
industrial concentration is an important factor in explaining price rigidity.  
   Price rigidity is also present when the demand curve is kinked (Sweezy, 1939), implying 
that the decreases in prices are more likely than increases in response to the actions of 
competitors. Stigler (1947) though stated that explicit anticompetitive practices between a 
few large firms in highly concentrated industries cannot cause a kinked demand curve. Also 
Stigler and Kindahl (1970) hypothesized that the only source of price flexibility is upward 
price movement. Furthermore, Phlips (1969) suggested that upward price flexibility behaves 
in the same way for both highly concentrated and slightly concentrated industries and argued 
that an increase in the unit cost of production is followed by an increase in price. In addition, 
Phlips (1980) argued that industrial concentration affects price indirectly through cost 
changes. Finally, Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) found that the speed of price adjustment is 
positively correlated with industrial concentration.  
 This paper develops a new theoretically-founded model to explain the relationship 
between industrial concentration and price rigidity in the Indonesian food and beverages 
industry. The model also captures the price adjustment in response to cost increases or 
decreases. The Indonesian food and beverages industry is characterized by a high price-cost 
margin and technical inefficiency, and a high industrial concentration, with some sectors 
consisting of only a few large firms (see Setiawan et al., 2012a, b). A priori it is expected that 
firms in this highly concentrated food and beverages industry can use their market power to 
                                                            
2Means used the term of “administered price” as the price that does not change frequently in the oligopoly 
structure because of market power. 
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maintain the high price-cost margin and that they can create upward price flexibility when 
cost increases, but downward price rigidity when cost decreases (see Adji, 1996; Solikin and 
Sugema, 2004; Hutabarat, 2006; and Central Bank of Indonesia, 2009). From a policy 
perspective, downward price rigidity could lead to significant welfare losses and, therefore, 
should be targeted by policy makers. Also this investigation would help the Indonesian 
government and Central Bank in identifying sectors that are more likely subject to price 
rigidity. Monitoring these sectors more intensively may improve the effectiveness of the 
inflation policy of the Indonesian government. 
 Pricing in the food and beverages industry affects the entire Indonesian economy 
significantly because this sector represents a large share of the country’s GDP and total value 
of industrial production3. To date, hardly any research has been conducted into the 
relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity in the Indonesian food and 
beverages industry. Adji (1996) used data from other manufacturing industries to investigate 
the relation between industrial concentration and price change, whereas Solikin and Sugema 
(2004) investigated price rigidity for the entire Indonesian economy. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the approach to 
measuring price rigidity and industrial concentration and for modeling their relation. This is 
followed by the description of the data in section 3 and the discussion of the results of the 
empirical estimation in section 4. The last section presents conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
                                                            
3Since 2004, the output of this sector accounted for about 7% of the GDP and about 23% of the total industrial 
manufacturing output. Additionally, the food and beverages sector absorbed about 23% of total employment in 
the Indonesian manufacturing industry in 2006, and employment in the industry grew significantly (about 19%) 
in 2006 compared to 2005. 
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4.2  Price rigidity and industrial concentration  
To measure price rigidity relating with industrial concentration, this research uses a partial 
adjustment model to determine the speed of price adjustment as a measure of price rigidity. 
The partial adjustment model was first introduced by Nerlove (1958) and assumes that the 
adjustment of a variable to an equilibrium is likely to be incomplete, e.g. due to the presence 
of factors that cause rigidity. Therefore, the speed of price adjustment will provide evidence 
of price rigidity. The partial adjustment model is specified as: 
10 ; ) ( 1
*
1    t-ttt P-PPP                                                                                     (1)                    
where tP  is the actual price in period t , 
*
tP  is the desired or equilibrium price level, and 
 captures the speed of price adjustment. Although the partial adjustment model has been 
used by other researchers to explain price rigidity (see Shaanan and Feinberg, 1995 and 
Bedrossian and Moschos, 1988), their models did not explicitly include a behavioral model 
under an oligopoly structure. 
  To establish the relationship between the speed of price adjustment and industrial 
concentration, this research uses the equilibrium price suggested by the Cournot model of 
pricing4. The Cournot model fits with the conditions of the Indonesian food and beverages 
industry, since this industry is characterized by an oligopoly structure and imperfect 
information (see Setiawan et al., 2012a, b). Following the Cournot model of pricing, the Nash 
equilibrium is used as the desired or equilibrium price level. We start from the inverse 
demand function for the output of a given subsector: 
 ii qQP  *                           (2)        
                                                            
4The Cournot model assumes that the firms influence the price through their strategies in output markets, which 
is also assumed to be the only source of price control in this study. 
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where iQ   is the subsector’s output excluding output from firm i ( iq ). Profit maximizing 
behaviour for firm i with different marginal costs among firms ( ic ) results in: 
ii qcP *                                                (3) 
Multiplying and dividing the right-hand side of (3) by the subsector’s total output yields: 
ii MSQcP  *                                               (4) 
where iMS  is the market share of firm i. By multiplying each side of (4) by iMS  and adding 
across all N firms in the subsector we obtain: 
 
 

N
i
N
i
iii MSQcPMS
1 1
2* )(                                   (5) 
HHIQcP  *                                    (6)     
cHHIQP  )(*                                     (7)    
where c  is the weighted (by market share) average per unit cost of production,  and HHI is 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Substituting (7) into (1) and pooling all subsectors in one 
model  yields: 
1,)1()(  tjjtjtjt PcHHIQP                                                                           (8)      
where j indexes subsectors. Since λ appears directly in three places in the model, we can 
rewrite (8) as: 
)( 1,
*
 tjjtjtjt PcHHIP                                                                                       (9)   
where HHI* is the interaction between total subsector output and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. Equation (9) is expressed in percentage terms of price change yielding the following 
expression: 
)()(
1,
1,
1,1, 



tj
tjjt
jt
tj
jt
tj
jt
P
Pc
HHI
P
Q
P
P                                                                        (10)  
Price rigidity and industrial concentration Chapter 4 
 
69 
 
Since
jt
jt
Q
P

 ,the term )(
1, tj
jt
P
Q  can be viewed as an approximation to the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand,
PQ,
1
 .  Additionally, the variable 1,
1,


tj
tjjt
P
Pc
can be viewed as an 
approximation to the negative of a Lerner index (L).  
  In the empirical model, subsector-specific dummies are added to equation (10) in order 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity among subsectors. Moreover, in order to investigate 
the difference in price adjustment for cost increases versus cost decreases, a dummy variable 
is added. This dummy variable allows for a different speed of price adjustment for upward 
and downward movements in the unit cost of production. This results in the following 
econometric model: 
)(
P
Pc
DCUP
HHI
P
Q
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P
Pc
HHI
P
Q
P
P
jt
tj
tjjt
jt
tj
jt
tj
tjjt
jt
tj
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jt
11                                                                                   )(                
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1,
2
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1
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





  
Equation (11) is then written as: 
)(PCDCUPHHIDCUPPCHHIP jtjtjtjtj jt 12            )( )()()(% 2
*
1
*    
where HHI* is 


 

HHI
P
Q
tj
jt
1,
, (C-P) is 


 

  
1,
1,
tj
tjjt
P
Pc
, DCUP is 1 if a cost increase relative to 
the previous period occurs and 0 otherwise.  Equation (12) is used to estimate the speed of 
price adjustment, λ, which  is assumed to be constant over a period of cost and price change. 
This equation is estimated for the whole food and beverages industry and for subsectors with 
different degrees of industrial concentration. Doing so, allows for testing for differences in 
the  speed of price adjustment. Following the USA September 1992 Merger Guidelines, this 
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research classifies the groups of firms as5: unconcentrated (HHI ≤ 0.1), moderately 
concentrated (0.1 < HHI ≤ 0.18), and highly concentrated (HHI> 0.18).  
 
4.3 Data 
This research uses firm-level (establishment) data to estimate industrial concentration in each 
subsector of the food and beverages industry. The data are obtained from the Annual 
Manufacturing Survey provided by the Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS). The 
dataset covers the period 1995-2006 for which the data are tractable and comparable for all 
subsectors among the years. This research uses 59 subsectors of the food and beverages 
industry, classified into 5-digits of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
level6. Estimation of the speed of price adjustment is conducted at the 4-digit rather than the 
5-digit ISIC level in order to maintain a sufficient number of observations per subsector7.  
 The percentage of price change is measured as the percentage change of the price index 
of the products in each subsector of the food and beverages industry. The price index is 
deflated by the consumer price index of food and beverages products (base year 2000) in 
order to eliminate the effect of inflation. The actual price is transformed into a price index 
because each subsector has different units of measurement for different products. Total 
                                                            
5The original classification from the USA September 1992 Merger Guidelines uses HHI unit as 1000 instead of 
0.1. 
6Actual codes used are not the ISIC codes, but comparable, coming from Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha 
Indonesia (KBLI). There are 59 subsectors in the food and beverages industry classified into 5 digit of ISIC 
level, 55 of which are related to the food processing, with the remaining to the beverages industry.  
7The use of the 4-digit ISIC level rather than the 5-digit can increase the number of observations for some 
subsectors in the model because it can pool some subsectors with 5-digit ISIC level in 4-digit ISIC level. 
However, the 4-digit ISIC level of the food and beverages industry still represents firms with relatively similar 
production processes. Also regarding the limitation of the data, this research assumes a symmetric effect of 
product differentiation on the pricing behaviour  in each subsector. 
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output for each subsector is defined as the value of output produced every year and divided 
by the annual subsector price index of the food and beverages industry (base year 2000). Unit 
cost is the per unit variable cost for each subsector of the food and beverages industry, 
deflated by the consumer price index with base year 2000.   
 Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data used in this research. It is shown that 
the average price is 0.993 which varies between 0.277 and 2.800; the per unit cost varies 
between 0.130 and 2.989 with an average of 0.989. The variation of unit cost is larger than 
the variation of price (0.458 and 0.354, respectively). Furthermore, the variation of the % 
price change is very high (4.307) with the average of the % price change being 7.074%. 
Therefore, it is expected that there is low price rigidity in the food and beverages industry, on 
average. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables from 1995-2006 across subsectors 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Minimum Maximum 
Unit cost  0.989 0.458 0.463 0.130 2.989
HHI  0.267 0.254 0.951 0.005 1.000
Price  0.993 0.354 0.356 0.277 2.800
% change of price  7.074 30.466 4.307 -54.400 188.000
Total Output 
(Million  Rupiah) 
206305.722 556413.151 2.697 39.716 7.360·105
N-Subsectors 59 59 59 59 59
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 From the Table 4.1 it is also seen that the average HHI is 0.267, which characterizes the 
food and beverages sector as highly concentrated, according to the criteria of USA September 
1992 Merger Guidelines. Furthermore, the data show that the HHI and total quantity among 
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subsectors vary significantly, with the coefficients of variation being 0.951 and 2.697, 
respectively.  
 
4.4  Results 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the empirical results of the estimation of the model in (12) on the 
relationship between % price change, per unit cost, and industrial concentration. The results 
are obtained after accounting for heteroscedasticity using the White-heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator. The Hausman (1978) test suggests that the random effects model is 
rejected in favor of the fixed effects model at the 5% and 10% critical level for the model 
representing the whole food and beverages industry and for all models of the individual 
subsectors8.  
  From Table 4.2, it is concluded that the interaction variable of industrial concentration 
and total output has a positive effect on the price change in the industry model at the 5% 
critical level. The coefficient of HHI* in Table 4.2 suggests that an increase of HHI* by one 
unit, increases the % price change by 0.7%, ceteris paribus. The effect of the HHI* on the % 
price change when costs increase is significantly higher (by 1.8%) than when the costs 
decrease (DCUP·HHI*). To get the pure effect of industrial concentration on the % price 
change for each subsector, we have to take compute the marginal effect of HHI. On the % 
price change equation (12) suggests a positive marginal effect of industrial concentration, 
since the estimates of λβ when the costs decrease (HHI*) and when the costs increase 
(DCUP·HHI*) are positive with coefficients of 0.007 and 0.025, respectively. Therefore, it is 
concluded that industrial concentration has a positive effect on the % price changes. 
 
                                                            
8Also a Wald test employed to test the coefficient differences of λβ and λ among subsectors suggested a 
common coefficient in the models at the 10% level of significance. 
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Table 4.2 Regression of industrial concentration and price change 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable : %ΔPrice 
Industry Model 
 Coefficient 
Intercept -1.202*** 
(0.974) 
HHI* 0.007** 
(0.003) 
(C-P) 0.125*** 
(0.01) 
DCUP·(C-P) 0.115*** 
(0.021) 
DCUP·HHI* 0.018*** 
(0.003) 
R2 0.407 
F-statistics 7.154*** 
Notes: Standard error in the parentheses 
            **   denotes test statistic significance at the 5% level 
            *** denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level  
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
  The speed of price adjustment (coefficient of C-P) is estimated at 0.125 and is almost 
double (0.240) when costs increase than when they decrease. This implies that prices adjust 
such that roughly 12.5% of the gap between actual and equilibrium prices is covered per year, 
with the adjustment being significantly faster when costs increase (roughly 24%). 
  Table 4.3 presents parameter estimates from the models on subsectors classified as 
unconcentrated, moderately concentrated, and highly concentrated. The results show that the 
HHI* affects the % price change significantly only in the moderately and highly concentrated 
subsectors with the coefficients of 0.007 and 0.010, respectively. HHI* has a significant 
effect on the % price change when costs increase rather than decrease for all groups showed 
by the coefficients of DCUP·HHI*. These results suggest that industrial concentration has a 
positive effect on the % price change. Although the speed of price adjustment is significant 
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for all models as shown by the coefficients of (C-P), the speed of price adjustment is still 
quite low, especially when the costs go down. 
Table 4.3 Regression of industrial concentration on price change 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable : %ΔPrice 
Unconcentrated Moderately Concentrated Highly Concentrated 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept -1.371 
(1.857) 
-3.909* 
(2.120) 
-0.260 
(1.171) 
HHI* 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
(C-P) 0.180*** 
(0.020) 
0.113*** 
(0.032) 
0.109*** 
(0.013) 
DCUP·(C-P) 0.002 
(0.038) 
0.111** 
(0.056) 
0.218*** 
(0.032) 
DCUP·HHI* 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
R2  0.480 0.399 0.413 
F-statistic  8.259*** 5.767*** 6.964*** 
N 15 subsectors 13 subsectors 31 subsectors 
Notes: *     denotes test statistic significance at the 10% level    Standard error in the parentheses 
           **   denotes test statistic significance at the 5% level 
           *** denotes test statistic significance at the 1% level 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
  The speed of price adjustment is significantly higher when costs increase than when they 
decrease in the moderately and highly concentrated subsectors with coefficients of 0.113 and 
0.109 (significant at the 5% and 1% critical levels, respectively) when the costs go down and 
the coefficients increase by 0.111 and 0.218 when the costs go up, respectively. The highly 
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concentrated subsectors have the largest speed of price adjustment when costs go up with the 
coefficient of 0.327 or different by 0.218 from the situation when the costs go down (0.109). 
This implies that prices adjust such that roughly 10.9% of the gap between actual and 
equilibrium prices is covered per year, with the adjustment being significantly faster when 
costs increase (about 33%) in the highly concentrated industry. Nevertheless, the moderately 
and highly concentrated subsectors do not have a significantly different speed of price 
adjustment when costs go down with coefficients (associated with C-P in Table 4.3) of 0.113 
and 0.109, respectively. 
  Furthermore, the unconcentrated subsectors have no significant difference in the speed of 
price adjustment when costs go up and down with coefficients of 0.180 and 0.182, 
respectively (at the 10% critical level). This suggests that the competitive structure leads to a 
symmetric adjustment in price in response to changes in cost. In spite of this, the 
unconcentrated subsectors have the largest speed of price adjustment when costs go down 
compared to the concentrated subsectors, with a point estimate of 0.180. 
  Table 4.4 presents the speed of price adjustment consistent with (12) for each subsector 
using the 4-digit ISIC level. From this table, it is seen that there is tendency for most 
subsectors with moderate and high industrial concentration (HHI>0.1) to have a lower speed 
of price adjustment when the costs go down and to have higher speed of price adjustment 
when costs go up. For the unconcentrated subsectors (HHI≤0.1) there is not clear pattern for 
speed of price adjustment in response to  cost increases or decreases. For the unconcentrated 
subsectors “Prepared Animal Feed” and “Bakery Products”, the speed of price adjustment is 
higher when costs go up than when they go down and the reverse holds for the two other 
unconcentrated subsectors “Macaroni, Noodles etc.” and “Soft Drinks etc.”. 
 
 
 
Price rigidity and industrial concentration Chapter 4 
 
76 
 
Table 4.4 Speed of price adjustment of subsectors in 4 digit ISIC level 
ISIC Level 
Speed of Price 
Adjustment Average 
HHI When costs 
go down 
When costs 
go up 
1511-Animal Slaughtering and Meat Processing 0.076 0.102 0.271 
1512-Processing/Preserving of Fish 0.151 0.140 0.156 
1513-Processing/Preserving of Fruit and Vegetables 0.032 0.401 0.446 
1514-Animal and Vegetables Oils and Fats 0.180 0.211 0.472 
1521-Dairy Products 0.245 0.336 0.423 
1531-Grain Mill Products 0.146 0.284 0.282 
1532-Starches and Starch Products 0.106 0.303 0.242 
1533-Prepared Animal Feeds 0.196 0.316 0.100 
1541-Bakery Products 0.141 0.319 0.048 
1542-Sugar Processing 0.071 0.316 0.290 
1543-Chocolate and Sugar Confectionery 0.049 0.111 0.240 
1544-Macaroni, Noodles, Couscous, and Similar 
Farinaceous Products 
0.052 0.050 0.068 
1549-Other Food Products N.E.C. 0.181 0.272 0.120 
1550-Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits; ethyl 
alcohol production from fermented materials; Wines; 
malt liquors and malt 
0.113 0.059 0.377 
1554- Soft drinks; Production of mineral waters 0.461 0.200 0.049 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
  Also, Table 4.4 shows that subsectors that produce non-storable goods and have the 
possibility of differentiating their products (“dairy products” and “processing/preserving of 
fruit and vegetables”), tend to have a higher speed of price adjustment when the costs go up 
than down. The firms operating in subsectors where product differentiation is possible may 
have monopolistic power on the products which enables them to control the price over the 
cost so that they can maintain their high price-cost margin. Thus, the possibility of product 
differentiation could be a source of upward price flexibility. Also firms producing non-
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storable products may be forced to respond quickly to the cost increases implying a higher 
upward price flexibility. In conclusion, although there may be other factors affecting price 
flexibility in a highly concentrated industry, Table 4.4 shows that the flexibility of price in 
response to cost changes in the most concentrated industries behaves in the same way in all 
subsectors.  
 
4.5 Conclusions and discussion 
This paper investigates the relation between price rigidity and industrial concentration in the 
Indonesian food and beverages industry using a model in which the speed of price adjustment 
is based on a partial-adjustment mechanism and the Cournot model of pricing.  
  The results suggest that industrial concentration affects price flexibility positively in the 
food and beverages industry, mainly for the moderately and highly concentrated subsectors. 
Also the effect of industrial concentration is higher when the costs go up than when the costs 
go down. Furthermore, the speed of price adjustment is larger when average costs go up than 
when they go down in the more concentrated subsectors. In addition, the unconcentrated 
subsectors have the largest speed of price adjustment when costs go down and the highly 
concentrated subsectors have the largest speed of price adjustment when costs increase.  
  This research concludes that more concentrated subsectors are characterized by a higher 
downward price rigidity in response to a cost reduction and a higher upward price flexibility 
in response to a cost increase. Furthermore, although the Cournot model used in this research 
does not account for a possible collusion, output-based price setting through collusion may 
exist in sectors that are classified as moderately and highly concentrated. Finally, this 
research finds that the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity is more 
conclusive in the concentrated industries. Since in the competitive market, industrial 
concentration has no effect on the percentage price change and firms adjust more rapidly to a 
cost reduction as well as less rapidly to the cost increase compared to the concentrated 
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subsectors, more competition between firms in the industry is expected to lead to the 
downward price flexibility. 
  Better information about the price flexibility in the industry may improve the 
effectiveness of the anti-inflation policy implemented by the Indonesian government and 
Central Bank of Indonesia. In cooperation with the Commission for the Supervision of 
Business Competition (KPPU), the Republic of Indonesia may also increase competition, 
break cartels and end anticompetitive practices. 
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Structure, Conduct, and Performance: Evidence from the Indonesian Food and 
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Abstract 
This article employs the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm to investigate the 
simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency, and price-cost margin in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. This 
research extends the SCP framework by including price rigidity and technical efficiency as 
additional key variables. The results suggest that there is a simultaneous relationship between 
industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency and price-cost margin with a 
positive bi-directional relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin. 
These findings imply that an appropriate course of action for the regulator in this highly 
concentrated industry is to reduce industrial concentration in order to increase competition, 
reduce upward price flexibility, and increase technical efficiency in the long run. 
 
Keywords:  structure, conduct, and performance, food and beverages industry,  panel data 
and simultaneous equations model, technical efficiency 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Indonesian food and beverages sector contributes significantly to the country’s GDP and 
employment, as well as the well-being of the local population. Since 2004, the output of this 
sector accounted for about 7% of the Indonesian GDP and about 23% of the total industrial 
manufacturing output. Indonesian households spent, on average, about 50% of their income 
on food and beverages products in the period 2005-2006. Given its importance to the 
country’s economy, understanding the behaviour and performance of producers in the food 
and beverages sector is essential for stimulating growth and avoiding welfare losses. The 
oligopoly structure in this sector increases not only the price-cost margin, but also technical 
inefficiency (Setiawan et al., 2012a, b). Furthermore, Setiawan et al. (2012c) showed that the 
price in the Indonesian food and beverages sector was more flexible in going up than going 
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down. The conditions of technical inefficiency, oligopoly structure, high price-cost margins, 
and price rigidity lead to welfare losses for consumers, which have to be targeted by policy 
makers. The simultaneity of the relation between industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
technical efficiency, and price-cost margin is also important. A simultaneous relationship 
suggests that firms are actively pursuing strategies (see Schmalensee, 1982; Lipszynski and 
Wilson, 2001) and, as a consequence, the regulator faces a more complex policy design. The 
existence of a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin may induce the regulator to intervene in the market directly to reduce industrial 
concentration. 
 In the economics literature, the relationship between industrial concentration, price 
rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin has been frequently investigated using the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm (Bain, 1951; Zellner, 1989; Kalirajan, 1993; 
Setiawan et al., a, b, c). The original SCP paradigm postulates that there is a one-way 
relationship between the three fundamental concepts, running from structure to conduct to 
performance (see Mason, 1939, 1949; Bain, 1951, 1956). This single-direction-of-causality 
assumption has been challenged by many empirical studies (Clarke and Davies, 1982; 
Zellner, 1989; Kalirajan and Shand, 1992; Kalirajan, 1993). On the other hand, Lipczynski 
and Wilson (2001) presented a schematic representation of the SCP approach which includes 
the possibility of feedback from conduct and performance on structure. Additionally, 
although structure and conduct in an industry can affect performance, the variables measuring 
performance themselves can interact as well. For example, technical efficiency is an 
important factor determining the price-cost margin (see Kalirajan and Shand, 1992) that 
could interact with another variable in the SCP paradigm, i.e. industrial concentration (see 
Setiawan, 2012b).  
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 Although the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency and price-cost margin in the SCP paradigm has for long been investigated in single 
and simultaneous equations models, the mutual relationship among all variables has not been 
considered. Kalirajan and Shand (1992) investigated the causality between technical 
efficiency and price-cost margin. Also Kalirajan (1993) concluded that there was a bi-
directional relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin. Setiawan et 
al. (2012a, b, c) accounted for the problem of simultaneity, but only investigated the partial 
effect of industrial concentration on price-cost margin, technical efficiency, and price rigidity 
in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. From an econometric point of view, ignoring 
the problem of simultaneity could lead to false statistical inferences. Thus, studying the 
relationship among all variables in one simultaneous system of equations is important for 
empirical and policy reasons. 
The aim of this paper is to measure industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency and price-cost margin and to empirically investigate the simultaneous relationship 
among these variables in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. This research 
contributes to the literature on the SCP framework by including technical efficiency as a 
performance variable into the system of equations, and by including price rigidity as an 
indicator of conduct. The analysis is performed within the SCP paradigm where feedback 
from conduct and performance on structure is not excluded a priori. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual 
framework of the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency and industrial concentration. This is followed by the modeling approach in section 
3 and a description of the data in section 4. The results are presented and discussed in section 
5. The last section presents conclusions and policy implications. 
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5.2 The relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical 
efficiency, and price-cost margin 
This section presents a theoretical underpinning, as well as a review of empirical findings for 
the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency and 
price-cost margin.  
 
5.2.1 Determinants of technical efficiency 
Technical efficiency (TE) refers to the ability of a decision-making unit (usually a firm) to 
minimize input used in the production of a given bundle of outputs, or the ability to obtain 
maximum output from a given bundle of inputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). Besides the 
amount of inputs affecting technical efficiency, which are by definition embedded in the 
technical efficiency score, external factors such as industrial concentration can influence the 
allocation of resources and technical efficiency. The quiet-life hypothesis argues that there is 
no pressure and no incentive for firms to increase their efficiency in a highly concentrated 
market. Gumbau-Albert and Maudos (2002) derived a model representing the relationship 
between technical efficiency and industrial concentration in the form: 
jtjtj XTE
TELn  


1                                                      (1) 
where j and t index subsector and period, respectively, TE is technical efficiency, and X are 
explanatory variables, including industrial concentration (IC). 
Gumbau-Albert and Maudos (2002) found evidence in support of the quiet-life 
hypothesis, i.e. industrial concentration had a negative impact on technical efficiency. 
Furthermore, Setiawan et al. (2012b) concluded that there was a one-way relationship 
between industrial concentration and technical efficiency, with only industrial concentration 
affecting technical efficiency negatively and not vice versa. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
industrial concentration negatively affects technical efficiency.  
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5.2.2 Determinants of price-cost margin 
Price-cost margin (APCM) represents the ability of firms in the industry to mark up the price 
over production cost. Mathematical derivations of the effect of industrial concentration on the 
price-cost margin are found in Saving (1970), Cowling and Waterson (1976), Fischer and 
Kamerschen (2003a, b), and Kamerschen et al. (2005). Cowling and Waterson (1976) derived 
the following linear relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin for 
profit maximizing firms1: 
HHIAPCM                                                                                        (2) 
where APCM is price-cost margin measured by profit plus fixed cost divided by revenue and 
HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  
 Zellner (1989), Kalirajan (1993), and Setiawan et al. (2012a) showed that industrial 
concentration had a positive effect on the price-cost margin. Since few firms in a 
concentrated industry can exert their market power to influence price or quantity, it is 
expected that industrial concentration increases the price-cost margin. Bauer (1990) and 
Kalirajan and Shand (1992, 1999) found that price-cost margin could be affected by technical 
efficiency supporting the efficient-structure hypothesis2. Furthermore, Kalirajan and Shand 
(1992) found that only technical efficiency affected price-cost margin, but not vice versa. 
Firms in an industry with high technical efficiency can minimize the use of their inputs or 
maximize their outputs. Therefore, it is hypothesized that high technical efficiency leads to 
higher price-cost margin. 
                                                            
1 We simplify the writing of parameters from the original equation. 
2 Originally they used the profit ratio or the price-cost margin to measure allocative efficiency. As a rule-of-
thumb, allocative efficiency can be achieved if the above-normal profit is zero (i.e. price-cost margin is zero) 
(see also Marsden, 2006; Volkerink et al., 2007). The high price-cost margin leads to higher price for firms as 
well as in the industry, ceteris paribus, which then reduces consumption. The lower consumption would reduce 
the combined welfare of consumer and producer which turns into the lower degree of allocative efficiency.    
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 This research also considers industry size (Size) and demand growth (Growth) as 
exogenous variables affecting the price-cost margin. In a competitive market with no entry 
barriers (procompetitive argument), industry size can affect the price-cost margin negatively 
because firms are forced to lower their markups and increase their output to cover fixed costs. 
Industry size may affect the price-cost margin positively in a less competitive market because 
entry is more restricted in such a market (see Epifani and Gancia, 2006). Furthermore, 
demand growth can affect price-cost margin positively through larger sales in the market.  
 
5.2.3 Determinants of industrial concentration 
Industrial concentration (IC) is a measure of uneven distribution of market shares of firms in 
an industry. In the SCP paradigm, industrial concentration is always connected to firm 
behavior (conduct) and industrial performance. The argument of the equilibrium condition for 
profit maximization may be one of the fundamental reasons why industrial concentration can 
be affected by price-cost margin, since both industrial concentration and price-cost margin 
can be influenced by the cost and demand conditions in the industry (see Clarke and Davies, 
1982; Jacquemin et al., 1980; and Kalirajan,1993). Using the previous derivation of Cowling 
and Waterson (1976), Clarke and Davies (1982) found an endogeneity problem in the linear 
approximation of (2), deriving price-cost margin and HHI equations. They suggested that 
estimating both price-cost margin and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index equations using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) produces an inconsistent estimator.  
 Kalirajan (1993) found a two-way relationship between industrial concentration and 
price-cost margin, where the price-cost margin affected industrial concentration positively. 
The increase of capacity as a result of the higher price-cost margin can result in a positive 
effect of price-cost margin on industrial concentration. Therefore, a high price-cost margin 
could affect industrial concentration, positively.  
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Furthermore, based on Zellner’s model (1989) and Setiawan et al. (2012a), this research 
uses demand growth (Growth) and capital-output ratio (COR) as exogenous variables 
determining industrial concentration. Capital-output ratio is used in the model to represent 
capital intensity as in Bhattacharya (2002). In addition, industrial growth and capital-output 
ratio are hypothesized to have a positive and negative effect on industrial concentration, 
respectively. Moreover, following empirical evidence (Setiawan et al., 2012b)3, this paper 
assumes that technical efficiency does not affect industrial concentration.  
 
5.2.4 Determinants of price rigidity 
Price rigidity is defined as the condition where some prices adjust slowly in response to 
changes in per unit cost or changes in supply or demand4. We use price rigidity as an 
indicator of firm conduct, since we argue that price rigidity represents the policy and pricing 
objectives that characterize the conduct variable as in Lipczynski and Wilson (2001). Caucutt 
et al. (1999), Bedrossian and Moschos (1988), and Setiawan et al. (2012c) suggested that 
price rigidity could be affected by industrial concentration and cost. Higher industrial 
concentration is expected to result in lower upward price flexibility in case there is no 
collusive behaviour among the firms in the industry (see Sweezy, 1939). Otherwise, firms in 
a highly concentrated industry can exert market power by adjusting prices more slowly when 
costs decrease and more quickly when costs increase (see Setiawan et al., 2012c). Setiawan et 
al. (2012c) derived a linear model to investigate the relationship between industrial 
                                                            
3 Setiawan et al. (2012b) concluded that the efficient-structure hypothesis does not apply in the food and 
beverages industry. 
4 Specifically, price rigidity in kinked demand curve introduced by Sweezy (1939) is defined as the slow price 
adjustment with respect to the other competitors’ strategy. 
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concentration and price flexibility (PM) from a combination of the Cournot oligopoly and 
partial adjustment models: 
)()(
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1,
1,1, 


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where j and t index subsectors and year. Since 
jt
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Q
P

 , )(
1, tj
jt
P
Q  approximates the 
inverse of the elasticity of demand,
PQ,
1
 . They found that high industrial concentration 
increases the percentage price change.  
 The effect of the unit cost (Ucost) on price rigidity is hypothesized to be negative, 
meaning that higher unit cost leads to higher price flexibility. The change in unit cost can 
affect the production plan which also affects price. Industry size is included as a control 
variable to explain price rigidity and is expected to have a positive effect on price flexibility, 
since industry size may reflect the quantity demanded in the market (see also Kandil, 1996).  
 
 Summarizing the theoretical background, it is hypothesized that the mathematical 
relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-
cost margin can be written in the following system of equations: 
TE=f(IC)                                                                                                (4)                          
APCM=g(IC, TE, Size, Growth)                                                  (5) 
IC=h(PCM, Growth, COR)                                                                   (6) 
PM=d(IC, Ucost, Size)                                                                          (7) 
where 0

IC
TE , 0

IC
APCM , 0

TE
APCM , 0

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
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5.3 Modelling approach 
Based on the theoretical considerations and previous empirical findings presented in the 
previous section, equations (8)-(11) are proposed to reflect the simultaneous relationship 
between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin 
linearizing the mathematical relationships in the system of equations (4)–(7): 
TEjt = αj + β1ICjt + εjt                                                                                    (8) 
ICjt = ρj + λ1APCMjt + λ2Growthjt + λ3CORjt + ψjt                    (9) 
APCMjt = γj + θ1ICjt + θ2TEjt + θ3Sizejt +  θ4Growthjt +vjt                        (10) 
PMjt = μj + δ1ICjt + δ2Ucostjt + δ3Sizejt + ejt                                               (11) 
where j and t indicate the subsector within industry and period, respectively; PM is price-
change magnitude or price flexibility, Ucost is unit cost of production, TE is technical 
efficiency, IC is industrial concentration, APCM is price-cost margin, Size is industry size, 
COR is capital-output ratio, Growth is demand growth, and ε, ψ, v, and e are error terms that 
capture statistical noise. Based on the equations (8)-(11), the exogenous variables used in the 
system are Size, Growth, COR, and Ucost. Equations (8)-(11) are estimated using an 
appropriate method for systems of simultaneous equations with panel data. Since both TE and 
IC as expressed by the CR4 are restricted in the unit interval, we take the logit transformation 
of TE and CR45.  
This research uses two measures of industrial concentration (IC): concentration for 4-
firms (CR4) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). CR4 considers the collective share of 
the four largest firms in a subsector, while HHI considers the uneven distribution of market 
shares of all firms in a subsector. Both indicators of industrial concentration are based on the 
market share of the firms and calculated by the formulas as in Pepall et al. (2002 p. 55-57) 
                                                            
5 The logit transformation maps CR4 or TE from the unit interval to the real line by using the inverse of the 
logistic function, xe1
1
.  
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and Setiawan et al. (2012a, b, c)6. Both CR4 and HHI have limitations, but they complement 
each other. CR4 is commonly used to classify the market into some categories of oligopoly 
(see Shepherd, 1999), but it cannot capture the distribution of the market share for all firms in 
the market. However, HHI can capture the distribution of the a firm’s market share in a 
market, but it is rather difficult to classify the oligopoly categories from the HHI. In spite of 
this, Besanko et al. (2004) gave a classification of market structure based on HHI. 
Furthermore, Liebenberg and Kamerschen (2008) also discusses the importance of using both 
HHI and concentration ratio. Hence, it is necessary to use both concentration measures to 
clearly depict the market structure in the industry. 
Price rigidity is measured by the percentage price-change (PM), rather than the absolute 
percentage price change used by Caucutt et al. (1999). The percentage price-change (PM) is 
formulated, as follows: 
PM = Log(Pt/Pt-1)                                                                                                        (12) 
Using the percentage price change instead of absolute price change can reflect price rigidity 
in either upward or downward movements. 
Firm technical efficiency is estimated by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as 
described in Setiawan et al. (2012b). This research uses the output-oriented DEA model with 
variable returns to scale (VRS). We use output-oriented DEA to identify technical 
inefficiency as a proportional increase in output production, with input levels held fixed. This 
assumption can be relevant in Indonesian economy because small and medium firms find 
difficulties to access financial institutions in order to expand their business in most of the 
periods. Firm-specific efficiency scores are obtained by solving the mathematical 
programming problem as in Coelli et al. (2005 p.180): 
                                                            
6 Considering stocks, this paper calculates industrial concentration based on sales data because sales seem to 
explain more about market share than output. 
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A variable returns to scale model is used here as the industry is characterized by many 
distortions, preventing firms from operating at an optimal scale. The output oriented 
efficiency scores assume values in the interval from 0 to 1. In order to reduce the serial 
correlation in the efficiency scores among firms, this research uses the bootstrap technique of 
Simar and Wilson (1998). As the final result, we provide the biased-corrected efficiency 
scores as accurate measure of efficiency, obtained using the bootstrap method: 
 ),(ˆbias),(ˆ),(ˆˆ yxyxyx B    
            = 


B
b
b yxByx
1
*1 ),(ˆ),(ˆ2                                                   (14)                                  
),(ˆ yx  and ),(ˆˆ yx are the consecutive original and biased-corrected efficiency scores, and 
),(ˆ* yxb is the bootstrap estimate of the efficiency score in the bth out of B  bootstrap 
repetitions.  Technical efficiency scores for each subsector are estimated using firm-level data 
by averaging the efficiency scores of all firms in the subsector. We calculate average 
technical efficiency for each subsector, because we can not relate technical efficiency and 
industrial concentration in the firm-level data.  
 Price-cost margin is a measure of industrial performance (see Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 1974; 
Domowitz et al., 1986; Prince and Thurik, 1992). The price-cost margin (PCM) is calculated 
according to the formula proposed by Domowitz et al.7 (1986), Prince and Thurik (1992), and 
                                                            
7 This approach, which has also been used in Domowiz et al. (1988) has been challenged by Kamerschen and 
Park (1993a, b).  In the same year, Domowitz et al. (1993) replied that they did not view  the comment by 
Kamerschen and Park (1993a, b) as a substantive criticism of their (1988) paper and the issue remains open. 
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Setiawan et al. (2012a). This price-cost margin  formula allows for changes in inventories 
where considering that changes in inventories are important in the calculation with regard to 
the fluctuation in the business cycle in the Indonesian economy from 1995-20068. 
 The system of equations (8) - (11) is estimated using system GMM with fixed-effects. 
The system GMM is applied to the simultaneous equations by using instrumental variables 
which should be valid in the system (see Cornwell et al., 1992; Ahn and Schmidt, 1999). The 
instrumental variables used for the estimation are the same for all equations i.e. Size, Growth, 
COR, Ucost, and all dummies reflecting the subsectors. The same instrumental variables are 
used for all equations because some previous research used all the instrumental variables as 
the exogenous variables that can enter to the all above equations (see Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, 
1978; Weiss, 1995; Zellner; 1989; Kalirajan, 1993). Also theoretically, all the instrumental 
variables can affect all the endogenous variables in our models. The validity of instruments 
i.e. orthogonality condition of all instruments with the error terms, is tested using the Hansen 
(1982) J-test. Since this research uses heterogenous subsectors and yearly data, to correct for 
the possibility of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems, the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix is used, using the Newey-West (1987) 
estimator with the Bartlett Kernel function.  
 
5.4 Data 
This research uses firm-level data (establishment) to estimate industrial concentration, price-
cost margin, technical efficiency, price rigidity, and instrumental variables in each subsector 
of the food and beverages industry. The data are obtained from the Annual Manufacturing 
Survey provided by the Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS). The dataset covers the 
                                                            
8 
esΔInventori  Sales
 esΔInventorilabor ofCost  - added Value
 PCM 
  
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period 1995-2006 for which the data are tractable and comparable for all subsectors9. The 
technical efficiency estimation allows for using only 33 out of 59 subsectors of the food and 
beverages industry10 classified into 5 (five) digits of the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) level11.  
The DEA models used for estimating technical efficiency distinguish one output and 
three inputs, i.e. raw materials, labor and fixed capital such as buildings, machines and 
equipment. Output is defined as value of gross output produced per establishment every year 
and deflated by the Wholesale-Price Index (WPI) of food and beverages. Labor efficiency 
units are used as a proxy for labor use12. Raw materials are the total costs of domestic and 
imported raw materials (including other costs related to the production such as electricity and 
fuel cost) and are deflated by the WPI of raw materials for food and the official WPI for 
imported raw food, respectively, published by the BPS. We define fixed capital as fixed 
assets, deflated by the WPI of machinery (excluding electrical products), transport 
equipment, residential and non residential buildings. 
                                                            
9 In spite of this, some subsectors are not fully reported in 2006.  
10 This paper includes the subsectors with minimum observation of 30 to get the valid results of technical 
efficiency estimation. It results to 33 subsectors  where 6 (six) of them are the combination of the subsectors 
with observation less than 30, but they are still in the same ISIC 4 digit and they have close production process. 
The 6 (six) new subsectors are derived by combining subsectors with insufficient observations in the following 
way: 15113 = 15111+15112 ; 15130 = 15131+…+15134+15139 ; 15210=15211+…+15213 ; 15319 = 15312 + 
15314+…+15318 ;  15320 = 15321 + 15324+ 15329 ; 15420 = 15422+15423+15424+15429. 
11 Actual codes used are not the ISIC codes, but comparable, coming from Klasifikasi Baku Lapangan Usaha 
Indonesia (KBLI). Actually, there are 59 subsectors in the food and beverages industry classified into 5 digit of 
ISIC level, 55 of which are related to food processing, with the remaining to the beverages industry.  
12 We modify  the formula for labor efficiency units used by Tybout and Westbrook (1995) by : 
)
 workerproduction ofSalary 
erother work ofSalary  
(*erother work ofNumber   worker production ofNumber   L   
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Price-change magnitude as a measure of price rigidity is calculated using the growth of 
(deflated) price index of the products in each sub sector of the food and beverages industry 
(base year 2000). The actual price is transformed into a price index in order to make the 
price-change magnitude comparable across subsectors producing different outputs. Total 
output for each subsector is defined as the value of output produced every year and deflated 
by the annual sectoral WPI of the food and beverages industry (base year 2000). Unit cost is 
the per unit variable cost for each subsector of the food and beverages industry, deflated by 
the consumer price index with base year 2000. The use of real (deflated) prices eliminates the 
effect of inflation, especially in the period of very high inflation during the economic crisis in 
1997-1998. The actual unit cost is transformed into an index to make the index comparable 
across subsectors. Further details on the construction of the variables are provided in the 
appendix. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables from 1995-2006 across subsectors 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Minimum Maximum 
Average Price-Cost Margin (APCM) 0.186 0.072 0.387 -0.516 0.419
CR4 0.483 0.227 0.470 0.076 0.991
HHI 1210.498 1220.988 1.090 43.399 7323.505
Percentage of Price change (PM) 7.244 30.176 4.166 -48.169 197.860
Unit Cost (Ucost) 99.667 23.288 0.234 60.661 176.679
Material (in million Rupiah) 185.259 1254.719 6.773 0.102 127257.103
Labor (Person Index) 171.845 1281.995 7.460 4.000 167086.381
Capital (in million Rupiah) 1901.208 65435.776 34.418 0.099 7321000
Output (in million Rupiah) 225.270 1372.521 6.093 2.113 74304.753
Capital-output Ratio (COR) 4.243 12.638 2.979 0.054 92.828
Growth of VA (Growth) 0.352 0.943 3.727 -0.863 6.466
Size (Ln of Value Added) 19.626 1.571 0.080 15.609 23.657
Source: authors’ calculation 
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Table 5.1 shows that the average CR4 over years and subsectors is 0.483, which 
classifies the food and beverages industry as an oligopoly (see Shepherd, 1999 about the 
classification). The average price-cost margin (APCM) is positive during the period of 
estimation with an average of 18.6%. Furthermore, the capital-output ratio (COR) and growth 
of demand measured by growth of value added (Growth) have high coefficients of variation 
(2.978 and 3.727, respectively). The coefficients of variation of the inputs (material, labor, 
and capital) and output variables among the subsectors of the food and beverages industry are 
also quite high. This suggests big differences in the size of the firms and technologies used 
between subsectors. 
Table 5.2 Technical efficiency scores and industrial concentration 
Period 
Average Biased-Corrected 
Efficiency Score 
CR4 HHI 
Price-Change 
Magnitude 
Price-Cost 
Margin 
Number 
of Firms 
1995-1997 0.552 0.449 1023.303 8.390 0.204 5495 
1998-2000 0.567 0.538 1445.602 20.304 0.186 4850 
2001-2003 0.539 0.472 1127.625 0.286 0.185 5299 
2004-2006 0.543 0.471 1245.821 0.006 0.188 6308 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 Table 5.2 presents the calculated values of industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. Table 5.2 shows that the average technical 
efficiency is around 55% during the period under investigation, which means that the firms in 
subsectors of the food and beverages industry on average exploit about 55% of their 
production potential. The CR4 is in the range of 0.449-0.538, which classifies the industry as 
a persistent oligopoly. The percentage price-change is fluctuating during the period under 
investigation in the range of 0.006% - 20.304%, whereas price-cost margin is more stable, on 
average in the range of 18% - 20%. The high fluctuation of industrial concentration and 
price-change magnitude during the period 1998-2000 coincided with a major economic crisis 
in the Indonesian economy. Technical efficiency also increased during the period of 
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economic crisis (1997-1998). Many firms left the industry in that period, suggesting that the 
more efficient firms remained, explaining the increase in technical efficiency. 
 From Table 5.2 it is also seen that the distribution of market shares, as captured by the 
HHI, changes over time during the period from 1995 to 2006. The average is 1210.498, and 
its volatility reflects the dynamics of competition among firms in the subsectors of the food 
and beverages industry.  
 
5.5  Results 
Table 5.3 presents the parameters estimates of equations (8)-(11), for two measures of 
industrial concentration: CR4 and HHI.   
 
Table 5.3 Parameter estimates on the relationship between price rigidity, technical 
efficiency, price-cost margin, and industrial concentration using system GMM 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable : PM Dependent Variable : TE 
Coefficients  Coefficients Coefficients  Coefficients 
Intercept 15.129 
(63.669) 
17.493 
(74.259) 
1.059*** 
(0.186) 
1.334*** 
(0.177) 
CR4 
 
19.446* 
(10.387) 
 -0.788*** 
(0.236) 
 
HHI  22.709* 
(12.557) 
 -0.925*** 
(0.237) 
UC 31.808*** 
(7.323) 
30.957*** 
(8.139) 
  
Size 0.107 
(2.606) 
-0.729 
(3.513) 
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Table 5.3 continued 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable : APCM Dependent 
Variable : CR4 
Dependent 
Variable : HHI 
Coefficients  Coefficients Coefficients  Coefficients 
Intercept -0.119* 
(0.085) 
-0.144* 
(0.087) 
1.278 
(1.173) 
1.356 
(1.270) 
CR4 
 
0.045** 
(0.020) 
   
HHI  0.060** 
(0.024) 
  
BEFF 
 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.039* 
(0.020) 
  
SIZE 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
  
APCM   9.599** 
(4.215) 
8.110* 
(4.575) 
COR   0.010 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
GROWTH 0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.027  
(0.046) 
Hansen-J statistic for the system with CR4 model = 0.104, p-value (df=5) = 0.990 
Hansen-J statistic for the system with HHI model = 0.097, p-value (df=5) = 0.990 
Notes:  *      denotes significance at the 10% level                       Standard errors in parentheses 
            **    denotes significance at the 5% level 
            ***  denotes significance at the 1% level  
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 Table 5.3 provides the values of the Hansen (1982) J-statistic of the system to test the 
validity of all instruments. The results of the Hansen-J test suggest all instruments in the 
system are valid as their orthogonality is not rejected at the 1% critical level for both models 
using CR4 and HHI measures of industrial concentration. The tests fail to reject the 
orthogonality condition between the error terms and all instruments in the system. 
 Results in Table 5.3 show that there is a simultaneous relationship between industrial 
concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency and price-cost margin, with all SCP 
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variables affecting each other significantly (at the maximum of 10 % critical level) in the 
system. Also, there is a two-way relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin where industrial concentration affects positively price-cost margin and price-cost 
margin affects positively industrial concentration. Industrial concentration has a positive and 
negative effect on the price-change magnitude and technical efficiency, respectively. 
Furthermore, technical efficiency affects the price-cost margin significantly where higher 
technical efficiency increases the price-cost margin. These results are in line with findings of 
Zellner (1989), Kalirajan and Shand (1992), Kalirajan (1993), Bhattacharya (2002), and 
Setiawan et al. (2012a, b, c). 
Industrial concentration has a negative effect on technical efficiency with coefficients of            
-0.788 and -0.925 for the model with CR4 and HHI measures and significance at 5% and 1% 
critical level, respectively. The coefficients indicate that industrial concentration increases 
technical inefficiency in the food and beverages sector. A one unit increase in the logit of 
CR4 and in HHI decreases the logit of technical efficiency by -0.788 and by -0.925 units, 
respectively13. The marginal effect of the CR4 is -0.008 suggesting that the increase of the 
CR4 by 1 unit, decreases the technical efficiency by 0.008 units, ceteris paribus14. The result 
supports the quiet-life hypothesis which states that firms operating in the highly concentrated 
industry have no pressure to increase their technical efficiency. 
Moreover, industrial concentration has a positive effect on the price-cost margin at the 
5% critical level with coefficients of 0.045 and 0.060, respectively. A one unit increase in the 
logit of CR4 and HHI, increases price-cost margin by 0.045 and 0.060 units, ceteris paribus. 
                                                            
13 Although the coefficient of logit CR4 does not have a direct one-to-one interpretation with the change of 
percentage of price change (and later with the other variables in the other equations), the sign of the coefficient 
robustly indicate such relationship. 
14 This marginal effect of CR4 )4/( CRTE   is simply derived from the original equation. Other marginal 
effects related to the other equations are derived in the same ways.    
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The marginal effect of the CR4 variable are 0.002 indicating that the increase in the CR4 by 1 
unit, increases price-cost margin by 0.002 units, ceteris paribus. Technical efficiency has a 
positive effect on the price-cost margin at the 10% critical level (the marginal effect of 
technical efficiency is 0.001). Furthermore, Size has a positive effect on price-cost margin at 
the 1% and 10% critical levels for the model with CR4 and HHI, respectively. In addition, 
Growth is significantly influencing the price-cost margin only in the model of HHI at the 5% 
critical level.  
Price-cost margin has a significant positive effect on CR4 and HHI with coefficients of 
9.599 and 8.110 at the 1% critical level, respectively. A one unit increase in price-cost margin 
increases the logit of CR4 and HHI by 9.599 and 8.110 units, respectively. The marginal 
effect of the price-cost margin is 0.024 suggesting that the increase in the price-cost margin 
by 1 unit, increases the CR4 by 0.024 units, ceteris paribus. The results suggest that a higher 
price-cost margin enables firms to invest more on the capacity, thereby increasing the 
industrial concentration. Moreover, capital-output ratio and demand growth has no a 
significant effect on the industrial concentration (at the 10% critical level). 
Industrial concentration has a positive effect on the percentage of price-change with 
coefficients of 0.150 and 1.103 for the logit of CR4 and HHI at 10% critical level, 
respectively. The coefficients indicate that an increase of the logit of CR4 and HHI by one 
unit, ceteris paribus, increases the percentage price-change by 0.150 and 1.103 units, 
respectively. The marginal effect of the CR4 are 0.779 indicating that the increase of CR4 by 
1 unit, ceteris paribus, increases the percentage of price change by 0.779 units. The results are 
in line with the finding of Setiawan et al. (2012c) who concluded that higher industrial 
concentration leads to lower price rigidity in the food and beverages industry, especially 
when the cost goes up. In addition, unit cost has a significant effect on the price-change 
magnitude for the models with CR4 and HHI measures (at the 1% critical level, respectively). 
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Furthermore, market size has no significant effect on the price-change magnitude in the CR4 
and HHI models.  
 
5.6 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper employs the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm to investigate the 
simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency 
and price-cost margin. Compared to previous research, this paper extends the SCP framework 
by including  price rigidity and technical efficiency in the system of equations.  
The results indicate that there is a simultaneous relationship between industrial 
concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. Furthermore, the 
results show that there is a two-way relationship between industrial concentration and price-
cost margin. The results in this paper suggest that the original SCP paradigm is inadequate, as 
this paradigm postulates only a one way relationship between the three fundamental concepts 
of structure, conduct, and performance. This also suggests that firms are responsive to 
changes in the market. A change in one variable in the system leads firms to alter their 
strategies, which in turn leads to changes in other variables within the system simultaneously.  
The two-way relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin 
suggests persistence of high price-cost margin and high industrial concentration. High 
industrial concentration may lead to high price-cost margin and high price-cost margins 
increases concentration in the long run. Moreover, technical efficiency affects price-cost 
margin positively, since technical efficiency lowers the per unit cost of production. Also, it is 
found that higher industrial concentration leads to lower technical efficiency. This result is in 
line with the quiet life hypothesis as it indicates that there is no pressure for the firms in the 
highly concentrated industry to increase their efficiency. In addition, it is found that industrial 
concentration increases in price flexibility in the food and beverages industry. Previous 
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research showed that upward price flexibility in the Indonesian food and beverages industry 
was higher than downward flexibility. Hence, higher industrial concentration is expected to 
increase upward price flexibility rather than downward flexibility. 
The existence of a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, price 
rigidity, technical efficiency and price-cost margin has interesting policy implications. The 
results on the relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin suggest that 
the regulator should take direct action aimed at increasing competition in the highly 
concentrated industry. This is because high industrial concentration and high price-cost 
margin are persistent as a consequence of the positive bi-directional relationship between the 
two variables. This also can be a sign that the 1999 competition law in Indonesia had no 
significant impact on market conditions of the food and beverages industry (see also 
Setiawan et al, 2012a). The introduction of the 1999 competition law may not yet reduce the 
market power of firms in the food and beverages industry. An appropriate response for the 
regulator in this situation is to reduce industrial concentration by e.g. eliminating barriers to 
entry in the industry. This would increase competition, reduce market power of the firms and 
can lower the upward price flexibility. The higher competition in the industry is also expected 
to increase technical efficiency of the firms in the long run. 
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Appendix: Description of variables 
 CR4 = Share of 4 (four) big firms in sales, formulated by : 



4
1
4
i
ij MS  CR     where j = 1,2,…, m indexes the subsector, i = 1,2,…n indexes firms 
within a subsector, and MSi is the market share of firm i in its respective subsector.                                  
 Herfindahl-Hirschman index = 10000*)( 2
n
1



i
ij MS HHI
15 
 Price-change magnitude (PM)  = Log(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt is an subsector’s price index.          
 Price-cost margin (PCM) = 
esΔInventori  Sales
 esΔInventorilabor ofCost  - added Value

  
Where value added is calculated by sales minus intermediate inputs except labor cost, cost 
of labor is total wages (rupiah), inventory (rupiah), and sales (rupiah). Rupiah is an 
Indonesian unit of money. 
 Capital-output ratio (COR) = 
(rupiah)Output 
 (rupiah)asset  Total where total asset and output are deflated 
by consumer price index. 
 Demand growth (Growth) = 
1-t
1-tt
added Value
added Value added Value 
 
 Industry size (Size) = ln(Value added) where value of value added is deflated by consumer 
price index. 
 Unit cost (Ucost) = 
(rupiah)Output 
 (rupiah)cost  Total  where total cost and output are deflated by 
consumer price index.   
 
 
                                                            
15 Prior to estimation HHI was divided by 1000 to avoid reporting trailing zeros in the estimates associated with 
this variable.  
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6.1 Introduction 
The food and beverages industry contributes significantly to the Indonesian economy. 
Besides its contribution to the GDP and employment absorption, more than half of the 
household income, on average, is spent on products of this sector. This industry is 
characterized by high industrial concentration and market distortions1. The Indonesian 
competition law introduced in 1999 aimed at lowering the industrial concentration and 
correcting market distortions. However, this law may not work very well because of 
ineffective law enforcement on anti-competitive behavior (see Pangestu et al., 2002). Hence 
high industrial concentration in the food and beverages industry is persistent. High industrial 
concentration enables firms to control the price over the cost such that it is more flexible 
upwards in response to cost increases than downwards due to cost decreases. Thus, in a 
highly concentrated food and beverages market in Indonesia, few firms can gain a high price-
cost margin. In addition, a low competitive pressure for the firms operating in the highly 
concentrated sectors may cause the firms to be technically inefficient.   
 The main objective of this thesis was to examine the market structure, price rigidity, and 
performance as well as their relationship in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. This 
research differs from previous studies in terms of the variables used and the theoretical 
underpinning. A better understanding of the relationship between the variables may help 
policy makers in targeting anti-competitive behaviour.           
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses empirical 
issues in this thesis. Section 6.3 synthesizes results. Section 6.4 presents the policy and 
scientific implications of the results and section 6.5 presents the conclusions. 
 
                                                            
1 Before the 1999 economic reform, few firms had exclusive monopolies to supply some food and beverages 
products.  
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6.2 Empirical issues 
This thesis employs two theoretical concepts i.e. the structure-conduct-performance 
framework (SCP) and the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) framework2 as the 
basis for the empirical models. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 use the SCP framework to investigate the 
relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-
cost margin. Regarding the investigation on how industrial concentration evolves, the 
absolute β-convergence model is applied in the SCP framework to examine the convergence 
of industrial concentration in Chapter 2. The two-concepts within the SCP framework i.e. 
quiet-life and efficient-structure hypotheses underpin the relationship between industrial 
concentration and technical efficiency in Chapter 3. The new empirical industrial 
organization (NEIO) framework is used to relate industrial concentration and price rigidity in 
Chapter 4. 
 The original Structure-Conduct-Performance framework (SCP) suggests that there is a 
causal-effect that runs from structure to conduct to performance. This research extends the 
original SCP framework by having: (1) the bi-directional relationship between variables in 
the SCP framework (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 5), (2) the technical efficiency as 
another measure of performance correlated with industrial concentration in the empirical SCP 
model (Chapter 3), (3) two hypotheses i.e. quiet-life and efficient-structure hypotheses that 
are applied within the SCP framework (Chapter 3), (4) the relationship between two 
indicators of performance: price-cost margin and technical efficiency (Chapter 5). With 
respect to the extension in point (1), Chapters 2, 3, and 5 take into account the endogeneity 
problem arising from the two-way causal-effect between industrial concentration and price-
                                                            
2 NEIO framework is defined clearly in Bresnahan (1989) which is very different from the SCP framework in 
terms of measuring conduct and performance that relies on the model estimation rather than using accounting 
data. The model is also derived from a rigorous theoretical background such as the utility theory, demand and 
supply and profit maximization.  
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cost margin in the SCP framework. Consequently, Chapters 2, 3, and 5 extend the assumption 
in the model of Bain (1951) which treated industrial concentration as an exogenous variable, 
by instrumenting industrial concentration. Although Chapter 2 does not explicitly analyze the 
effect of performance on conduct and structure, taking into account the problem of 
endogeneity indicates that industrial concentration is also affected by price-cost margin3. 
With respect to the extensions in points (1), (2), and (3), Chapter 3 uses technical efficiency 
as a measure of performance and tests the two-way causal-effect between industrial 
concentration and technical efficiency. The result is very relevant to support or reject the 
assumption in Chapter 2 on whether firms operating in the highly concentrated industry gain 
high price-cost margin through anti-competitive practices. Chapter 5 investigates the effect of 
technical efficiency on the price-cost margin to account for the extension under point (4). 
Also in line with the extension in point (1), Chapter 5 extends the models from Chapter 2 to 
Chapter 4 by investigating all variables representing the structure, conduct, and performance 
(SCP) framework simultaneously. In this chapter, industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin are hypothesized to have a two-way causal-effect in the system of equations4. 
 Furthermore, Chapter 4 uses the NEIO framework, departing in this way from the SCP 
framework used in Chapters 2, 3, and 5. The model derived in this chapter is a new structural 
model to investigate the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity. The 
                                                            
3 The aim of this chapter is just to verify whether industrial concentration affects price-cost margin, mainly 
comparing before and after the introduction of 1999 competition law. Further, Bain (1951) suggested that 
structure affects conduct (collusion) implicitly, and then affects performance. Bain argued that collusion (can be 
expressed or tacit) is embedded in the market structure with few firms operating in the highly concentrated 
industry resulting in high profitability. 
4 All variables representing the SCP framework are applied in Chapter 5 because all information about how the 
relationship between the variables takes place are now known from previous chapters. Furthermore, the 
objectives of the previous chapters are to examine the relationship between some variables based on previous 
research. Also investigating the relationship between the variables partially would bring a strong argument and 
robustness when each variable is correlated with other variables in a system of equations. 
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model has an advantage compared to the models from the SCP framework because it is 
firmly based on microeconomic theory. However, the main reason of using this NEIO 
framework is to estimate the parameter associated with the speed of price adjustment related 
to the market structure which could not be extracted from the SCP framework-based model. 
The Cournot model is combined with the partial adjustment model to get a new model, 
explaining the relationship between industrial concentration and price rigidity5.  
 This research extends the econometric methods to investigate the relationship between 
industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin by 
applying an appropriate technique for the system of equations in Chapter 5 i.e. Generalized 
Method of Moments (system GMM). The system GMM is applied to get unbiased as well as 
consistent estimators. Besides solving the problem of contemporaneous residual correlation 
among the equations, the method also corrects the problem of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  
 The data used in this research are panel data which is a combination of cross-section and 
time series data. Firms (establishments) are surveyed over the period 1995-2006 by the 
Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS). The data from BPS have three strengths: (1) 
The data cover the firms in the industry established in all regions in Indonesia. (2) The data 
set is relatively accurate because it is based on a transparent scientific methodology. (3) The 
products in each subsector classified by BPS are relatively homogenous. However, there are 
also weaknesses in the data set. First, the data surveyed collected by BPS represent only 
medium and big manufacturing firms in the food and beverages industry and do not cover the 
small firms. In spite of this, the survey still represents the food and beverages industry 
because according to Hill (1990), in the aggregate, the exclusion of small firms is not a 
                                                            
5 Although the Cournot oligopoly model implies that firms use output as the strategy, this would not affect the 
argument of firms affecting the price rigidity in the highly concentrated industry, since the firms can control the 
price through the output setting 
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serious problem because small firms contribute no more than 15% of total manufacturing 
value added in 1985. Furthermore, the small firms contribute only 4.01% to non-oil export in 
2006. The small firms only serve the local market rather than the national market. Second, 
BPS reports firm data based on establishment. This may underestimate industrial 
concentration, but the trend is still the same (Bird, 1999). Third, the assumption of uniform 
price in the Indonesian food and beverages industry may be problematic given the geographic 
diversity and size of the country. In spite of this, the firms and the population in Indonesia are 
concentrated in Java island and prices are relatively homogeneous across the provinces in 
Java island6. Also since the BPS reports firm data based on establishment, the uniform price 
is still possible because firms may have branches in other regions using the homogeneous 
input and transportation costs as in the Java islands. Finally, the data set from BPS has 
limitations in the variables provided. For example, the data set does not provide a variable 
that measures a conduct variable such as advertising expense. Also, the data set provides only 
one output for firms in each subsector implying that the technical efficiency calculation uses 
one output, instead of multiple outputs.     
 
6.3 Synthesis of results 
The results of the thesis are summarized in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1. Figure 6.1 shows the 
relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-
cost margin based on the results of all chapters. Figure 6.1 shows that industrial concentration 
affects significantly price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. Also industrial 
concentration and price-cost margin have a bi-directional relationship. Furthermore, 
exogenous variables (i.e. unit cost, capital-output ratio, industry size, and growth of demand) 
                                                            
6 Total population of Java island is almost 60% of the total Indonesian population and 82.54% of total medium 
and big firms are located in Java island. 
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affect the relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, 
and price-cost margin. 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1The relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, 
and price-cost margin  
 
  Table 6.1 summarizes the relationship between the variables in more detail based on 
results from all chapters. Chapters 2 and 5 find that industrial concentration affects price-cost 
margin positively. The estimation results are the same for the single equation (Chapter 2) and 
the system of equations (Chapter 5) suggesting this result is robust. Furthermore, Chapters 3 
and 5 as well as Chapters 4 and 5 find similar outcomes for the relationship between 
industrial concentration, technical efficiency and price-cost margin. Furthermore, industrial 
concentration has a negative and positive effect on technical efficiency price-cost margin, 
respectively. In addition, Chapter 5 finds that technical efficiency affects price-cost margin 
positively and price-cost margin has a positive effect on industrial concentration. Also there 
is a two-way relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin.       
 
 
Industrial concentration Price rigidity 
Technical efficiency 
Price-cost  margin 
Exogenous Variables: Unit cost, Capital-output ratio, Industry Size, Growth of demand 
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Table 6.1 The direction of the relationship between industrial concentration, price 
rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin.  
                Dependent Var. 
Independent Var.  
Industrial 
concentration 
Price-cost 
margin 
Technical 
efficiency 
Price rigidity 
Industrial concentration - (+) 
(Ch. 2 & 5) 
(-) 
(Ch. 3 and 5) 
(+) 
(Ch. 4 & 5) 
Price rigidity - - - - 
Technical efficiency - (+) 
(Ch. 5) 
- - 
Price-cost margin (+) 
(Ch. 5) 
- - - 
 
  Chapters 2 and 5 show that there is a positive effect of industrial concentration on the 
price-cost margin, but the effect of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin is 
reduced by the introduction of the 1999 competition law as found in Chapter 2. Furthermore, 
Chapter 2 finds that the law stopped the positive trend of the price-cost margin in the 
industry. However, in 2006 the industry still has high industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin. 
  Moreover, Chapters 3 and 5 suggested that the food and beverages industry is technically 
inefficient and industrial concentration could increase technical inefficiency in this industry. 
From these results, it can be concluded that high industrial concentration may cause the few 
firms to be technically inefficient. Having market power, the few firms in the industry could 
maintain a high price-cost margin through their ability to control the price as well as the 
output. Furthermore, the 1999 competition law had no significant impact on industrial 
concentration and price-cost margin. As explained in the previous paragraph, the law may 
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break the anti-competitive practices by stopping the positive trend of price-cost margin as 
well as decreasing the effect of high industrial concentration on the price-cost margin, but the 
law may not yet influence market power as well as the behaviour of firms in allocating the 
resources (see Chapter 2).      
 Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 found that the food and beverages industry and especially 
the concentrated subsectors may contribute to higher prices in the industry. Subsectors 
operating in the concentrated industry have a higher speed of price adjustment when costs go 
up than when costs go down compared to the unconcentrated subsectors. Furthermore, the 
unconcentrated subsectors have a higher speed of price adjustment when costs go down than 
the concentrated subsectors. These results are in line with the conclusion of Chapter 2 
suggesting that the few firms in the highly concentrated industry have market power to 
maintain the high price-cost margin.    
 Finally, Chapter 5 found that there is a simultaneous relationship between industrial 
concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. The relationships 
found between the variables are in line with those found in the previous chapters. 
Furthermore, the positive bi-directional relationship between industrial concentration and 
price-cost margin can be one of the reasons why high industrial concentration and price-cost 
margin are persistent in the Indonesian food and beverages industry. The high industrial 
concentration causes high price-cost margin and the few firms with high price-cost margin 
can invest heavily in the capacity and other beneficial market aspects that allow them to 
maintain or increase their market share. Maintaining their market share allows the firm to 
exercise market power to keep the desired price-cost margin by setting the upward price 
flexibility in the industry. 
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6.4 Implications of the results 
6.4.1 Policy implications 
The finding of Chapters 2 and 5 suggest that industrial concentration has a positive effect on 
the price-cost margin. Furthermore, Chapter 2 finds that the 1999 competition law reduces 
the effect of industrial concentration on the price-cost margin. Also, it stops the positive trend 
of the price-cost margin in the industry. However, the law did not reduce significantly the 
high industrial concentration and price-cost margin. Therefore, additional policy measures are 
needed to reduce market power by increasing competition as well as reducing industrial 
concentration in the long run.  
 The results of Chapters 3 and 5 suggested that the food and beverages industry is 
technically inefficient and industrial concentration has a negative effect on technical 
efficiency. From these results it is obvious that the high price-cost margin in the food and 
beverages industry as found in Chapter 2 is gained through anti-competitive practices rather 
than from higher technical efficiency. This suggests that policy makers should limit the firms 
to grow in size and support new entrants to the industry. Breaking the possibility of anti-
competitive practices is also a main concern of policy makers, and could reduce industrial 
concentration in the long run. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 found that the high industrial concentration increases price flexibility, 
especially when the costs go up rather than when the costs go down. It indicates that the 
highly concentrated subsectors contribute more to inflation than unconcentrated subsectors. 
Regarding that, the government should focus on the highly concentrated subsectors in order 
to target inflation.   
 Furthermore, Chapter 5 found a positive bi-directional relationship between industrial 
concentration and price-cost margin suggesting a persistent high industrial concentration and 
high price-cost margin in the industry. An appropriate policy implication in this regard is to 
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increase competition and reduce industrial concentration, so that it lowers the price-cost 
margin, which in turn, decreases industrial concentration continually in the long run.  
 The policy maker may limit the size of firms, increase competition and decrease 
industrial concentration through the following mechanisms. First, the government can 
eliminate all barriers to entry in the industry by opening access to all resources for all firms 
such as production and financial input and by eliminating regulations that give advantages to 
a few large firms. Economic distortions before 1999 caused few large firms to have exclusive 
monopolies on certain food and beverages. The monopoly power of these firms may still be 
observed nowadays. Second, the government should limit firms to increase size and market 
share, e.q. rejecting merger of big firms. This is also suggested by the findings of Chapter 4 
indicating that few firms in the highly concentrated industry tend to be inefficient. Third, the 
government should revise the competition law for a better interpretation and strict law 
enforcement. Pangestu et al. (2002) found ambiguities that are still subject to interpretation in 
the Indonesian competition law, which may make the investigation and the law enforcement 
on anti-competitive behavior ineffective. A strict law enforcement is needed to penalize 
anticompetitive practices such as cartels or trusts. The Commission for the Supervision of 
Business Competition (KPPU), the body responsible for enforcing the law in Indonesia, 
should be provided with strong instruments to find and break the anticompetitive practices. 
 
6.4.2 Scientific implications 
Society is concerned about welfare losses (dead-weight losses) that are caused by price 
rigidity, low technical efficiency, and high price-cost margin in the highly concentrated food 
and beverages industry. Therefore, research on these variables in the Indonesian food and 
beverages industry is relevant nowadays and in the future. 
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 This thesis provides methods that can be replicable in future research in other sectors of 
the Indonesian economy or in other countries. However, there are some issues that may be 
useful to be taken into account for future research related to the relationship between 
industrial concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin:  
1. Other methods can be applied to investigate the relationship between industrial 
concentration, price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. For example, a 
stochastic frontier approach (SFA) can be used to calculate technical efficiency. The SFA 
method can be compared to the DEA used in this research to see whether the results of 
the DEA method are robust. Other regression techniques such as tobit or truncated 
regression can be alternatives for estimating models with truncated variables.   
2. This research uses the data survey from the Indonesian Bureau of Central Statistics (BPS) 
which have limitations in terms of the available variables. Using better data than the BPS 
would give richer models and analyses. For example, data that can provide price and 
quantity would support an analysis of welfare losses. With better variable availability, 
advanced structural models in NEIO such as methods from Azzam (1997) and Berry-
Levinsohn-Pakes (1995) models can be applied to measure and investigate the 
relationship between technical efficiency, industrial concentration, price rigidity, and 
price-cost margin in a system of equations, without having a separate technical efficiency 
estimation using DEA or SFA techniques. 
3. This research derives a model from NEIO framework only to investigate the relationship 
between the industrial concentration and price rigidity. Therefore, the possibility of using 
other NEIO frameworks to derive a model relating the variables in the SCP framework 
can be promising future research.  
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4. Since the parameters’ robustness of the models is only tested using the existing data, an 
extended data period can be applied to test the robustness of the parameters to changes in 
the Indonesian food and beverages industry.  
 
6.5 Main conclusions 
The main objective of this research is to examine the market structure, price rigidity, and 
performance as well as their relationships for the Indonesian food and beverages industry. We 
arrive at the following main conclusions: 
 Industrial concentration converges towards the same value for all subsectors in the food 
and beverages industry.  
 Industrial concentration increases price-cost margin; the effect of industrial concentration 
is reduced by the introduction of the 1999 competition law.  
 The positive trend of price-cost margin stopped after the introduction of the 1999 
competition law indicating the effectiveness of the law in breaking the anticompetitive 
practices. 
 There is only a one-way causal impact of industrial concentration on technical efficiency, 
i.e. industrial concentration reduces technical efficiency.  
 Subsectors with higher industrial concentration have higher upward price flexibility.  
 The concentrated subsectors have a higher (lower) speed of price adjustment when the 
cost goes up (down) than the unconcentrated subsectors.  
 There is a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
technical efficiency, and price-cost margin.  
 There is a positive bi-directional relationship between industrial concentration and price-
cost margin.        
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Summary 
The Indonesian food and beverages industry has a share in the Indonesian gross domestic 
product of about 7% and provided employment for about 230 million people in 2006. 
However, the food and beverages industry is characterized by high industrial concentration, 
which increases the welfare losses for the economy as a whole. A few firms in the highly 
concentrated industry have market power which enables them to sustain the high price-cost 
margin by controlling the price. The main objective of this research is to examine the market 
structure, price rigidity, and performance as well as their relationships in the specific context 
of the Indonesian food and beverages industry. The main objective is divided into four 
research questions: (1) Does industrial concentration converge across subsectors of the food 
and beverages industry and what is the relationship between industrial concentration and 
price-cost margin after the introduction of the competition law in 1999? (2) Does industrial 
concentration have a causal impact on technical efficiency or is there a two-way causal 
relationship between these variables? (3) Does high industrial concentration limit price 
movements, especially when production cost decreases? (4) How are industrial concentration, 
price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin related when examined in a system? 
 This research uses firm-level (establishment) data of 59 subsectors of the food and 
beverages industry sourced from the manufacturing survey of Bureau of Central Statistics 
(BPS) during the period from 1995 to 2006. In order to break anti-competitive practices and 
reduce high price-cost margins in the food and beverages industry, the Indonesian 
government introduced the 1999 competition law. Chapter 2 investigates the trend in 
industrial concentration as well as the effect of industrial concentration and the 1999 
competition law on the price-cost margin. Empirical results show that industrial concentration 
converges to the same value for all subsectors. This suggests that highly concentrated 
subsectors are expected to become less concentrated in the long run, while the opposite is true 
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for subsectors that are currently characterized by relatively low concentration. Although the 
industrial concentration of the subsectors in the food and beverages sector tends to be slightly 
lower in the long run, the subsectors of the industry are still classified as tight oligopolies 
structure in the period covered by the data. Finally, as expected, industrial concentration is 
found to have a positive effect on the price-cost margin. The results suggest that the current 
policy design still does not reduce significantly the high industrial concentration and price-
cost margin.     
 Chapter 3 calculates technical efficiency in the food and beverages industry and 
investigates its relationship with industrial concentration. The results show that the 
Indonesian food and beverages industry is technically inefficient. Another important result 
suggests that there is only a one-way relationship between industrial concentration and 
technical efficiency: having higher industrial concentration reduces technical efficiency. This 
indicates that the quiet-life hypothesis rather than the efficient-structure hypothesis applies in 
the Indonesian food and beverages industry. This result suggests a policy to limit the growth 
of firm scale that causes high industrial concentration in the industry. 
 Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between price rigidity and industrial 
concentration. The analysis develops an estimable model from the combination of a partial 
adjustment model and a Cournot model of oligopoly. The research assumes that firms 
indirectly control the price through an output-setting mechanism. The results show that there 
is a positive effect of industrial concentration on the percentage of price change, especially in 
the more concentrated subsectors. Higher industrial concentration increases the output price 
of the industry. Also there is a significant price adjustment in the food and beverages 
industry. Another finding suggests that there is a higher speed of price adjustment when costs 
go up for the concentrated subsectors than for the unconcentrated subsectors. Also the 
unconcentrated subsectors have a lower speed of price adjustment than the concentrated 
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subsectors. These findings suggest that the high industrial concentration of the Indonesian 
food and beverages industry increases welfare losses. 
 The relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, and performance is 
investigated in a system of equations in Chapter 5. Using a system GMM estimation method, 
the results show that there is a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, 
price rigidity, technical efficiency, and price-cost margin. Also there is a positive bi-
directional relationship between industrial concentration and price-cost margin. This suggests 
that there is a persistent high industrial concentration and price-cost margin, since high 
industrial concentration causes high price-cost margin and high price-cost margin 
simultaneously increases industrial concentration. From this result, it is also suggested that 
the policy maker should design a policy that makes all firms operate in a highly competitive 
environment and reduce industrial concentration. Furthermore, technical efficiency has a 
positive effect on price-cost margin and industrial concentration has a negative effect on 
technical efficiency, in line with the results from previous chapters. As found in Chapter 4, 
industrial concentration has a positive effect on price flexibility in the food and beverages 
industry. 
 Chapter 6 provides the main conclusions and discusses the main findings as well as their 
scientific and policy implications. The main conclusions of this thesis are summarized as 
follows: 
 Industrial concentration converges towards the same value for all subsectors in the food 
and beverages industry.  
 Industrial concentration increases price-cost margin; the effect of industrial concentration 
is reduced by the introduction of the 1999 competition law.  
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 The positive trend of price-cost margin stopped after the introduction of the 1999 
competition law indicating the effectiveness of the law in breaking the anticompetitive 
practices. 
 There is only a one-way causal impact of industrial concentration on technical efficiency, 
i.e.  industrial concentration reduces technical efficiency.  
 Subsectors with higher industrial concentration have higher upward price flexibility.  
 The concentrated subsectors have a higher (lower) speed of price adjustment when the 
cost goes up (down) than the unconcentrated subsectors.  
 There is a simultaneous relationship between industrial concentration, price rigidity, 
technical efficiency, and price-cost margin.  
 There is a positive bi-directional relationship between industrial concentration and price-
cost margin.     
 
 
 
 129 
 
Samenvatting 
De Indonesische voedingsmiddelen en drankenindustrie heeft een aandeel in het Bruto 
Binnenlands Product van 7% en verschafte werkgelegenheid aan 230 miljoen mensen in 
2006. Deze industrie wordt echter gekenmerkt door een hoge graad van industriële 
concentratie, met negatieve economische gevolgen. Enkele bedrijven in deze industrie 
hebben marktmacht, die ze in staat stelt om een hoge prijs-kosten marge te handhaven. De 
hoofddoelstelling van dit proefschrift is om de marktstructuur, prijsrigiditeit en performance, 
alsook hun onderlinge samenhang te analyseren in de specifieke context van de Indonesische 
voedingsmiddelen en drankenindustrie. De hoofddoelstelling wordt opgedeeld in vier 
onderzoeksvragen: (1) Convergeert de mate van industriële concentratie over sub sectoren 
van de voedingsmiddelen en drankenindustrie en wat is de relatie tussen industriële 
concentratie en prijs-kosten marge na de introductie van de concurrentiewet in 1999? (2) 
Heeft industriële concentratie een causaal eenzijdig effect op de technische efficiëntie of is er 
sprake van een wederzijds effect tussen deze variabelen? (3) Beperkt een hogere industriële 
concentratie de prijsflexibiliteit, in het bijzonder wanneer de productiekosten afnemen? (4) 
Wat is de relatie tussen industriële concentratie, prijsrigiditeit, technische efficiëntie en prijs-
kosten marge wanneer dit wordt geanalyseerd als een systeem? 
 Dit onderzoek gebruikt gegevens van bedrijven in 59 sub sectoren van de 
voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie die zijn verzameld door het Centrale Bureau voor 
Statistiek (BPS) over de periode 1995-2006. Ten einde een eind te maken aan anti-
concurrentie praktijken en om de prijs-kosten marges te verminderen in de voedingsmiddelen 
en dranken industrie, heeft de Indonesische overheid in 1999 de concurrentie wet 
geïntroduceerd. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de trend in industriële concentratie, alsook het effect 
van industriële concentratie en de concurrentie wet uit 1999 op de prijs-kosten marge. De 
empirische resultaten laten zien dat de industriële concentratie convergeert naar de zelfde 
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waarde voor alle sub sectoren. Dit suggereert dat de concentratie van de sterk 
geconcentreerde sub sectoren vermindert op de lange termijn, terwijl het tegenovergestelde 
geldt voor de sub sectoren met een lage concentratie. Hoewel de industriële concentratie van 
de sub sectoren van de voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie naar lagere waarden tendeert 
op de lange termijn, kunnen de sub sectoren toch nog als oligopolie worden gekenschetst in 
de periode die wordt gedekt door de data. Tenslotte, zoals verwacht, heeft de industriële 
concentratie een positief effect op de prijs-kosten marge. De resultaten suggereren dat het 
huidige beleid de industriële concentratie en prijs-kosten marge nog altijd niet substantieel 
vermindert.  
 Hoofdstuk 3 berekent de technische efficiëntie in de voedingsmiddelen en dranken 
industrie en onderzoekt de relatie met de industriële concentratie. De resultaten laten zien dat 
voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie technisch inefficiënt is. Verder laten de resultaten 
zien dat er en eenzijdig causaal verband is tussen industriële concentratie en technische 
efficiëntie: een hogere industriële concentratie vermindert de technische efficiëntie. Dit 
suggereert dat de ‘quiet-life’ hypothese in plaats van de ‘efficient-structure’ hypothese van 
toepassing is op de Indonesische voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie. Overheidsbeleid 
moet er daarom op gericht zijn om de groei van bedrijven tegen te gaan. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek het verband tussen prijsrigiditeit en industriële concentratie. De 
analyse in dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op een combinatie van een partial adjustment model en 
een Cournot Oligopolie model. Het onderzoek veronderstelt dat bedrijven indirect controle 
uitoefenen over de prijs door een prijsstellingsmechanisme. De resultaten laten zien dat 
industriële concentratie een positief effect heeft op de procentuele prijsverandering, vooral in 
de meer geconcentreerde sub sectoren. Een hogere industriële concentratie vergroot de output 
prijs in de markt waarbinnen de sector opereert. Er is ook sprake van een significante 
aanpassing van de prijs in de voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie. De resultaten 
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suggereren verder dat de meer geconcentreerde sub sectoren een hogere snelheid hebben 
waarmee prijzen zich aanpassen na een verhoging van de productiekosten dan de minder 
geconcentreerde sub sectoren. Deze resultaten suggereren dat een hogere industriële 
concentratie van de voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie leidt tot welvaartsverliezen. 
 In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt het verband tussen industriële concentratie, prijsrigiditeit, en 
performance onderzocht in een systeem van vergelijkingen. De resultaten van de GMM 
schattingsmethode laten zien dat er een simultaan verband bestaat tussen industriële 
concentratie, prijsrigiditeit, technische efficiëntie en prijs-kosten marge. Er bestaat ook een 
positief en tweezijdig causaal verband tussen industriële concentratie en prijs-kosten marge. 
Dit suggereert dat de hoge industriële concentratie en prijs-kosten marge persistent zijn, 
aangezien hoge industriële concentratie bijdraagt aan een hoge prijs-kosten marge en een 
hoge prijs-kosten marge bijdraagt aan een hogere industriële concentratie. Deze resultaten 
suggereren dat de beleidsmakers beleid moeten ontwerpen dat leidt tot grotere concurrentie 
en lagere industriële concentratie. Technische efficiëntie heft een positief effect op de prijs-
kosten marge en industriële concentratie heft een negatief effect op technische efficiëntie, in 
lijn met de resultaten uit de vorige hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat industriële 
concentratie een positief effect heft op de prijsflexibiliteit in de voedingsmiddelen en dranken 
industrie. 
 Hoofdstuk 6 geeft de belangrijkste conclusies en bespreekt de bevindingen en hun 
wetenschappelijke en beleidsmatige implicaties. De belangrijkste conclusies van dit 
proefschrift zijn: 
 Industriële concentratie convergeert naar het zelfde niveau voor alle sub sectoren van de 
voedingsmiddelen en dranken industrie  
 Industriële concentratie vergroot de prijs-kosten marge; het effect van industriële 
concentratie is echter verminderd na de introductie van de concurrentiewet in 1999.  
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 Na de introductie van de concurrentiewet in 1999 is de positieve trend in de prijs-kosten 
marge gestopt, wat suggereert dat de wet effectief is geweest in het beëindigen van de 
anti-concurrentie praktijken. 
 Er is een eenzijdig causaal verband tussen industriële concentratie en technische 
efficiëntie: industriële concentratie vermindert technische efficiëntie.  
 Sub sectoren met een hogere industriële concentratie hebben een hogere opwaartse 
prijsflexibiliteit.  
 De meer geconcentreerde sub sectoren hebben een hogere (lagere) snelheid waarmee 
prijzen zich aanpassen aan kostenverhogingen (verlagingen) dan de minder 
geconcentreerde sub sectoren.  
 Tussen industriële concentratie, prijsrigiditeit, technische efficiëntie en prijs-kosten marge 
bestaat een simultaan verband.  
 Tussen industriële concentratie en prijs-kosten marge bestaat een positief tweezijdig 
causaal verband. 
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